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DEPRIVING OUR VETERANS OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS’
PRACTICE OF STRIPPING VETERANS OF THEIR SECOND
AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND OUR NATION’S RESPONSE
Stacey-Rae Simcox*
INTRODUCTION
The oath that every enlisted member and officer of the United States Armed
Forces takes before serving includes the solemn promise to “support and defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic” and to
“bear true faith and allegiance to the same.”1 This oath contains no time limit and
many veterans consider themselves to be bound by these promises for their entire
lives.2
*
© 2019 Stacey-Rae Simcox. Stacey-Rae Simcox is Associate Professor of Law and
Director of the Veterans Law Institute and Veterans Advocacy Clinic at Stetson University
College of Law.
1
10 U.S.C. § 502 (2006). The full enlisted oath is as follows: “I, [name], do solemnly
swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against
all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and
that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers
appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So
help me God.” Id. The full officer oath is as follows: “I, [name], do solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all
enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I
take this obligation freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion; and that I
will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter. So
help me God.” 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (1966); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3; 10 U.S.C. § 14309
(1966).
2
For instance, consider the preamble to the Constitution of the American Legion: “For
God and Country, we associate ourselves together for the following purposes: To uphold and
defend the Constitution of the United States of America; to maintain law and order; to foster
and perpetuate a one hundred percent Americanism; to preserve the memories and incidents
of our associations in the Great Wars; to inculcate a sense of individual obligation to the
community, state and nation; to combat the autocracy of both the classes and the masses; to
make right the master of might; to promote peace and good will on earth; to safeguard and
transmit to Posterity the principles of justice, freedom and democracy; to consecrate and
sanctify our comradeship by our devotion to mutual helpfulness.” AM. LEGION, NATIONAL
CONSTITUTION (1977), https://www.legion.org/documents/legion/pdf/Constitution%20and
%20By-Laws%202007.pdf [https://perma.cc/QMF3-44DN]. Similarly, the Disabled
American Veterans includes in the preamble to their National Constitution “we former
members of the armed forces of the United States . . . solemnly and firmly associate ourselves
together in creating the Disabled American Veterans, the principles and purposes of which
shall be supreme allegiance to the United States of America, fidelity to its Constitution and
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In contrast to the veterans’ lifelong promise to uphold the Constitution, the
federal government is treading on the rights of many of these same veterans by
systematically stripping them of their Second Amendment rights. This occurs when
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) declares a veteran incapable of financially
managing a benefit payment.3 To be clear, the VA is not making any determination
that a veteran is mentally ill or a danger to himself or others when it determines the
veteran “incompetent for VA purposes.”4 The VA merely decides that the veteran
may have difficulty appropriately managing monetary benefits received from the
VA5. The VA makes this determination haphazardly.
The results of the VA’s determination that a veteran is financially incompetent
are twofold: First, the VA ends up depositing the financially incompetent veteran
into its fiduciary system, which is continually under criticism and extremely difficult
to navigate, both when entering the fiduciary system and when trying to exit.6
Second, and most important for this Article, the financially incompetent veteran is
then stripped of his7 constitutionally protected right to own, possess, transfer,
purchase, and transport firearms without the same procedures and safeguards that
are afforded to other United States citizens.8 This deprivation occurs when the VA
laws . . . P.” DISABLED AM. VETERANS, NATIONAL CONSTITUTION (2014), https://www.dav.
org/wp-content/uploads/2014ConstitutionBylaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9MP-ZW5Z].
3
38 C.F.R. § 3.353(a)–(b) (2018).
4
Melanie Franco, VA Benefits – What Happens When You Are Found Incompetent?,
HILL & PONTON (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.hillandponton.com/va-benefits-happensfound-incompetent/ [https://perma.cc/L94W-L6NL].
5
38 C.F.R. § 3.353(a)–(b).
6
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE
OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, NO. 14-01883-371, AUDIT OF FIDUCIARY PROGRAM’ S
MANAGEMENT OF FIELD EXAMINATIONS 2–3 (2015); Benjamin Pomerance & Katrina Eagle,
The Pro-Claimant Paradox: How the United States Department of Veterans Affairs
Contradicts Its Own Mission, 23 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 26 (2017) (describing the fiduciary
program as a “quagmire,” and criticizing it for protracting the fiduciary appointment process
(citing Solze v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 118, 126 n.13 (2013) (Lance, J., dissenting) (stating
that “[the] growing consensus outside of VA [is] that the fiduciary system is broken”)).
7
The pronoun “he” is used throughout this Article to refer to the veteran. This is not to
discount the service of our women in uniform. However, because men make up
approximately 90% of living veterans and for the purpose of simplicity, the pronoun “he” is
used. See NAT’L CTR. FOR VETERANS ANALYSIS & STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
VETERAN POPULATION (2016), https://www.va.gov/vetdata/docs/Demographics/New_
Vetpop_Model/Vetpop_Infographic_Final31.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6SY-RJXV].
8
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, M21-1 ADJUDICATION PROCEDURES MANUAL:
PROCESSING AWARDS TO INCOMPETENT BENEFICIARIES, § B(4)(a) (2018), https://www.kno
wva.ebenefits.va.gov/system/templates/selfservice/va_ssnew/help/customer/locale/en-US/
portal/554400000001018/content/554400000014276/M21-1,-Part-III,-Subpart-v,-Chapter9,-Section-B---Processing-Awards-to-Incompetent-Beneficiaries [https://perma.cc/K8HBGARG] [hereinafter PROCESSING AWARDS]; Fast Letter 10-51 (Revised) from the Dep’t of
Veterans Affairs to all VA Regional Offices and Centers, Processing Requests for Relief
from the Reporting Requirements of the National Instant Criminal Background Check

2019]

VETERANS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

3

reports the veteran to the Department of Justice (DOJ) as someone who has been
“adjudicated as a mental defective” and is therefore prohibited from owning a
firearm.9 Divesting a veteran of his constitutional rights, in a manner that affords
fewer protections than other citizens receive, unconstitutionally infringes on the
veteran’s Second Amendment rights. This situation is particularly ironic and
shameful considering the lasting oath of all who have served in the Armed Forces
of the United States to support and defend the Constitution above all else.
Over the past decade, and most recently in 2017, Congress has considered,
debated, and periodically passed legislation that would prevent the deprivation of
the rights of veterans determined to be “financially incompetent” throughout this
process.10 Both proponents and opponents of such legislation recognize that, while
the current process the VA uses to declare a veteran a ‘mental defective’ may
inadvertently identify some veterans who are a danger to themselves or others and
thus prevent them from obtaining firearms, is the overreaching impact on the
constitutional rights of veterans who have never been adjudicated a threat an
acceptable trade-off?”11 Congress has decided that this trade-off is undesirable in the
Social Security system and has forbidden the Social Security Administration (SSA)
from implementing a plan to report incompetent payees to DOJ in a similar
manner.12 This begs the question: Why is this still a permissible practice in the VA?
This Article does not argue that veterans who have been adjudicated mentally
incompetent by a court after a hearing or have been involuntarily committed to a
mental health facility should be permitted to purchase or possess firearms. However,
this Article does compare the VA’s determination of “financial incompetency” to
other determinations of “mental defectiveness,” demonstrating that the VA’s
standards do not rise to the level of “adjudicat[ing] [the veteran] a mental defective”
in a manner sufficient for him to be stripped of his constitutional rights.13 This
Article also argues that including veterans determined financially incompetent for
VA purposes on a list of persons unable to exercise their Second Amendment rights
is an unconstitutional deprivation of these rights which must be remedied for all
affected veterans, past and future.
Part I of this Article explores VA policies and examines how the VA determines
that a veteran is incompetent for financial purposes. Part II discusses gun control
System (Feb. 20, 2014); Patrick Howley, VA Sends Veterans’ Medical Info to FBI to Get
Their Guns Taken Away, DAILY CALLER (Apr. 21, 2015), http://dailycaller.com/2015/04/21/
va-sends-veterans-medical-info-to-fbi-to-get-their-guns-taken-away/ [https://perma.cc/B4T
M-7GAB].
9
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2018).
10
See, e.g., Veterans 2nd Amendment Protection Act, H.R. 1181, 115th Cong. (2017)
(“To amend title 38, United States Code, to clarify the conditions under which [veterans]
may be treated as adjudicated mentally incompetent for certain purposes.”).
11
See, e.g., 163 CONG. REC. H2103–06 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 2017) (statement of Rep.
Roe) (“The right to bear arms is too important to deprive veterans of due process without a
judicial determination of whether the veteran poses a threat to themselves or others.”).
12
H.R.J. Res. 40, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted).
13
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2018).
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legislation and its effect on the ability of a financially incompetent veteran to possess
firearms. Part III applies the VA’s process by providing the case-study of a veteran
who the VA determined to be financially incompetent. Part IV explores the federal
legislation regarding incompetency decisions, including the SSA’s proposed rule
which would have followed the VA’s lead in reporting beneficiaries determined to
be financially incompetent, and curing legislation such as the Veterans 2nd
Amendment Protection Act. Part V analyzes the constitutional implications of the
VA’s process. Part VI concludes, emphasizing the need to address this issue and
providing some potential avenues of relief for veterans who have already been listed
as a prohibited person due to a determination of financial incompetence.
I. THE VA AND FINANCIAL INCOMPETENCY DETERMINATIONS
A. A General Overview of the VA and Concerns with the Process
The VA is a cabinet-level federal agency charged with providing benefits and
health care to our nation’s military veterans.14 Benefits that veterans15 may be
eligible to receive include educational benefits, pensions for elderly or low-income
veterans, and financial compensation for those veterans disabled during their service
to the nation.16 When a veteran is awarded pension or disability compensation
benefits, the benefits are granted to the veteran as a nontaxable monthly payment
that normally ranges from $133 to a little over $3000, depending on the veteran’s
level of disability as determined by the VA.17
To qualify for these benefits, a veteran must first file a claim for benefits with
the regional office of their local VA—also referred to as the agency of original
jurisdiction.18 Upon receiving a claim the VA will, among other things, request any
federal records that might help to prove a veteran’s claim, order a medical
examination of the claimant to help provide medical proof of a disability, and apply
14

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Office of Pub. & Intergovernmental
Affairs, VA Observes 10th Anniversary as a Cabinet Department (Mar. 15, 1999),
https://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=145 [https://perma.cc/3PPA-26NU];
About VA: History, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS., https://www.va.gov/about_va/va
history.asp [https://perma.cc/9HCL-HZ84] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
15
While there are benefits that are obtainable by spouses and dependent children of
deceased veterans, this article’s primary focus is on the benefits provided to veterans
themselves. Therefore, the term veteran, as opposed to claimant, will be used in this Article.
16
About VBA, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.benefits.va.gov/benefits/
about.asp [https://perma.cc/A9NC-YBKL] (last visited Sept. 13, 2018).
17
See Veterans Compensation Benefits Rate Tables - Effective 12/1/17, U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.benefits.va.gov/COMPENSATION/resources_comp01.
asp [https://perma.cc/2HA7-JKPL] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018); see also 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)
(2003).
18
How
to
Apply,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
VETERANS
AFFAIRS,
http://www.benefits.va.gov/compensation/apply.asp [https://perma.cc/ED8G-4EL6] (last
visited Aug. 24, 2018).
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a standard of proof that, in theory, is extremely lenient in granting the veteran a
benefit.19 These duties, although foreign in other administrative agency adjudication
processes, are hallmarks of the VA which has long been understood to be a
“nonadversarial” and “pro-claimant” (i.e., “pro-veteran”) system.20 After gathering
and analyzing all this information, the VA will decide the veteran’s claim for
benefits.21
If the veteran disagrees with the VA’s decision, the veteran has the right to
appeal. This appeal is initiated by filing a “notice of disagreement” with the regional
office within one year of receiving the VA’s decision.22 Upon receipt of a notice of
disagreement, and after review of any new evidence submitted by the veteran, the
regional office either agrees with the veteran and issues a new decision or sustains
its original decision in a document called the “Statement of the Case.”23 Upon
receiving a Statement of the Case, the veteran has sixty days to appeal to the next
level of the agency, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (the “Board”).24 The Board is
where, for the first time in the claims process, a judge within the VA, referred to as
a Veterans Law Judge, reviews the veteran’s file and the regional office’s
adjudication of that claim.25 If the veteran disagrees with the Board’s decision, the
veteran can appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
(CAVC), an Article I court.26
Three aspects of this appellate process are important for the purposes of this
Article: First, the timeline is exceedingly lengthy for a veteran’s claims to be
reviewed by a judge within the VA as well as an appellate judge. When a veteran
files an appeal of the Statement of the Case, it takes an average of four years from
the date of filing the appeal for the Board to render a decision.27 If the veteran’s
claims are remanded to the regional office, another 255 days on average is tacked
onto this wait.28 If the veteran appeals the Regional Office’s second decision, more
time is added to the process.29 Appealing a Board decision to the CAVC can take up
to an additional year, and a remand after that can add one to two additional years of
19

See Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096
(2000); 38 USC § 5103A (2017).
20
Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
21
38 U.S.C. § 7104 (a)–(b) (1996).
22
Id. § 7105(b)(1).
23
38 C.F.R. § 19.26 (2006).
24
38 U.S.C. § 7105 (2012).
25
See 38 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2001); see also Gateway to VA Appeals, Bd. of Veterans’
Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.bva.va.gov [https://perma.cc/Q3
Y8-S48H] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
26
38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (1998).
27
See BD. OF VETERANS APPEALS, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, ANNUAL
REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2015), https://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts
/BVA2015AR.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECM4-SWC3].
28
Id.
29
See id.
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waiting.30 The amount of time this process takes is unreasonable. Any decision made
by the regional office, especially an erroneous decision, can negatively affect a
veteran for years.31
Second, the available data clearly suggests that the VA often makes erroneous
decisions. This is demonstrated by the extremely high remand rates both at the Board
level and by the CAVC. In fiscal year (FY) 2015, the Board reported that it found
error with the decisions of the regional offices in approximately 46.5 percent of the
cases it reviewed, and subsequently remanded the claims.32 This is an increase over
previous years’ remand rates of 43–45 percent.33 In approximately 31 percent of the
cases, the Board outright granted the veterans previously denied claims, without
remand to the regional office for further development.34 The CAVC has an even
higher remand rate. In FY 2016 it remanded, in whole or in part, approximately 77
percent of the appeals it received from the Board due to error by the Board in its
review.35 More tellingly, approximately 87 percent of the cases remanded were
awarded Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) attorney’s fees.36 EAJA fees are
awarded in those cases where the veteran was the victorious party on appeal and the
CAVC determines that the VA had been holding a position against the veteran that
was not substantially justified.37 The high number of veterans’ cases where the court
decides that the VA takes a position that is not justified against the veteran from the
beginning, combined with the already high remand rates, reveal the VA’s high
propensity to make poor decisions concerning a veteran’s claims.
Third, a federal statute prohibits veterans from hiring a lawyer to help them at
the initiation of the claims-filing process.38 A veteran may not hire an attorney until
the veteran has filed a claim, received a decision from the regional office, and then
affirmatively appealed that decision by filing a Notice of Disagreement on his own,
or with the help of a veterans service organization (VSO).39 VSOs are nonprofit
groups, often made up of veterans themselves, that help veterans file claims at no
30

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2016),
https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2016AnnualReport [https://perma.cc/EKY6A9AR].
31
See generally Daniel L. Nagin, Goals vs. Deadlines: Notes on the VA Disability
Claims Backlog, 10 U. MASS. L. REV. 50 (2015) (providing a more detailed analysis of the
delay within the VA system).
32
See BD. OF VETERANS APPEALS, supra note 27, at 26.
33
Stacey-Rae Simcox, Thirty Years After Walters the Mission Is Clear, the Execution
Is Muddled: A Fresh Look at the Supreme Court’s Decision to Deny Veterans the Due
Process Right to Hire Attorneys in the VA Benefits Process, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 708
(2016).
34
See BD. OF VETERANS APPEALS, supra note 27, at 28.
35
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, supra note 30, at 2.
36
Id.
37
See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2018).
38
See 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) (2018).
39
See id.
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cost to the veteran.40 These VSOs do not ordinarily provide attorneys to help
veterans at the regional office or Board level.41
Considering the time it takes to appeal erroneous VA decisions, the number of
erroneous decisions made, and the significance of not being permitted to have an
attorney help with these issues, the impact of a flawed financial incompetency
determination by the VA becomes much more detrimental—particularly when that
decision deprives a veteran of his constitutional rights.
B. The VA Determination of Financial Incompetence
When issuing an award for veteran’s benefits, the VA must review the veteran’s
ability to manage any funds distributed to that veteran from the VA.42 This review,
as well as the determination of financial incompetency is completed by the regional
office processing the award of benefits, which is housed in the Veterans Benefits
Administration.43 These decisions are not reviewed by the Veterans Health
Administration, a separate division of the VA which provides medical care to
veterans.44 While previous medical records are expected to be considered by the
regional office when making the determination of financial incompetency, medical
providers in the Veterans Health Administration are not individually or specifically
40

See 38 C.F.R. § 14.628 (2018); 38 C.F.R. § 14.628 (2018); see also Veterans Service
Organizations, HOUSE COMM. ON VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, https://veterans.house.gov/resources
-for-veterans/veterans-service-organizations.htm [https://perma.cc/4XH4-VNAQ] (last
visited Dec. 9, 2018); see also The Role of National, State, and County Veterans Service
Officers in Claims Development: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Disability Assistance
and Memorial Affairs of the Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006).
41
See The Role of National, State, and County Veterans Service Officers in Claims
Development: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Memorial
Affairs of the Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006).
42
38 C.F.R. § 3.353(b); U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, M21-1 ADJUDICATION
PROCEDURES
MANUAL:
EVALUATING
COMPETENCY
§
A(1)(2)
(2018),
https://www.knowva.ebenefits.va.gov/system/templates/selfservice/va_ssnew/help/custome
r/locale/en-US/portal/554400000001018/content/554400000014211/M21-1-Part-IIISubpart-iv-Chapter-8-Section-A-Evaluating-Competency?query=m21-1%20part%20iii%
20subpart%20iv%20chapter%208#1
[https://perma.cc/NKX9-WNCG]
[hereinafter
EVALUATING COMPETENCY].
43
EVALUATING COMPETENCY, supra note 42. See also Dep’t. of Veterans Affairs
Organizational Chart, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (June 2009),
http://www.va.gov/ofcadmin/docs/vaorgchart.pdf [https://perma.cc/PW4V-E93Y]; About
VBA, Veterans Benefits Administration, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
http://www.benefits.va.gov/benefits/about.asp [https://perma.cc/A9NC-YBKL] (last visited
Sept. 13, 2018).
44
About VHA, Veterans Health Administration, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
https://www.va.gov/health/aboutVHA.asp [https://perma.cc/35JF-5H88] (last visited Sept.
13, 2018).
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consulted about the veteran’s competency.45 If the veteran filing the benefits claim
is also a patient of the Veterans Health Administration, and the medical provider has
never had reason to include comments in the patient’s records concerning the
patient’s ability to handle his own finances, then the records are considered silent on
the veteran’s competency for VA purposes.46 This often leaves the medical opinion
of the compensation and pension (C&P) examiner as the sole statement in the record
regarding financial incompetency. A C&P examination is the medical examination
provided by the VA for purposes of adjudicating the veteran’s benefits claim.47 The
C&P examiner is not the veteran’s treating physician and is hired by the VA solely
to diagnose claimed disabilities and provide medical opinions concerning the
etiology of these conditions.48 The C&P examiner may also be called upon to
determine the competency of a veteran suffering from certain disabilities.49
The quality of the C&P examination has been under fire for several years. For
instance, from 2009 to 2014, reliance on inadequate C&P examinations was one of
the top five reasons decisions appealed to the Board or CAVC were remanded back
to the regional offices.50 Critics also complain that C&P examiners do not spend
45
See generally EVALUATING COMPETENCY, supra note 42 (providing that previous
medical records should be considered in making the determination, but never including the
Veterans Health Administration in the Process).
46
See id. (stating that a “finding of incompetency cannot be made without a definite
expression by a responsible medical authority” unless clear and convincing medical record
evidence “that leaves no doubt as to the beneficiary’s incompetency” is present).
47
38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d) (2012); 38 C.F.R. 3.159(c)(4) (2016).
48
V.A. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS AUDIT OF V.A.’S
EFFORTS TO PROVIDE TIMELY COMPENSATION AND PENSION MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS 1
(2010); see Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295, 300–01 (2008) (stating that the
VA must provide an adequate examination with a reasoned medical explanation for any
determinations made); see also U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, M21-1 ADJUDICATION
PROCEDURES
MANUAL:
EXAMINATION
REPORTS
§
D(2)(1)
(2018),
https://www.knowva.ebenefits.va.gov/system/templates/selfservice/va_ssnew/help/custome
r/locale/en-US/portal/554400000001018/content/554400000015812/M21-1,-Part-III,Subpart-iv,-Chapter-3,-Section-D---Examination-Reports [https://perma.cc/YV3T-DNVK]
[hereinafter EXAMINATION REPORTS] (explaining that the VA’s examinations require the use
of a DBQ, which includes a diagnosis section, medical history, objective findings, results of
diagnostic testing performed, and a remarks section for any necessary explanation).
49
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, V.A. FORM 21-0960P-3, REVIEW POST
TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER (PTSD) DISABILITY BENEFITS QUESTIONNAIRE 6 (2018);
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, V.A. FORM 210960P-2, MENTAL DISORDERS (OTHER
THAN PTSD AND EATING DISORDERS) DISABILITY BENEFITS QUESTIONNAIRE 5 (2018); U.S.
DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, V.A. Form 21-0960C-9, MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS (MS)
DISABILITY BENEFITS QUESTIONNAIRE 6 (2016).
50
Hearing on Pending Legislation, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs,
114th Cong. 2nd Sess. 104 (2016) (statement of Diane Boyd Rauber, Executive Director,
National Organization of Veterans Advocates, citing Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
Appeals Data Requested by House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs Subcommittee on
Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs (Jan. 2015)).
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adequate time evaluating veterans for complex mental health conditions.51 Take, for
example, psychological C&P examinations completed for posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). Recognizing that the quality of C&P examinations for PTSD were
questionable, the Veterans Benefits Administration has published the “Best
Practices Manual for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.”52 This guide was intended to
help C&P examiners conduct more thorough PTSD examinations by establishing
best-practice standards.53 The manual advises that the “Initial PTSD compensation
and pension evaluations typically require about three hours, but complex cases may
demand additional time.”54 Despite establishing that three hours per “noncomplex”
PTSD examination is the best practice, C&P examiners are required to conduct
anywhere from three to six C&P examinations per day, which includes interviewing
the veteran, reviewing the claims file, reviewing the veteran’s entire medical record,
and documenting the exam.55 It is easy to see how C&P examinations can lack in
quality when the best practices established by the Veterans Benefits Administration
are not being implemented across the board.
The VA employee tasked with determining whether a veteran is financially
incompetent is referred to as the Rating Veterans Services Representative (RVSR).56
The RVSR rarely has any special legal training, need not be a medical professional,57
is generally a lower-level employee within the VA, and statistically, most likely has
been on the job for less than five years.58 The RVSR’s job is to, among other things,
51

Stacey-Rae Simcox, The Need for Better Medical Evidence in VA Disability
Compensation Cases and the Argument for More Medical-Legal Partnerships, 68 S.C. L.
REV. 223, 230–33 (2016).
52
See PATRICIA WATSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, BEST PRACTICE
MANUAL FOR POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER (PTSD) COMPENSATION AND PENSION
EXAMINATIONS 1 (2016) (providing information on PTSD and current recommendations
regarding best practices for assessing PTSD among veterans).
53
Id. at 2.
54
Id.
55
See, e.g., Mark D. Worthen, Veterans C&P Exams for PTSD and Other Mental
Disorders, Six C&P Exams Per Day (June 9, 2015), https://ptsdexams.com/six-cp-examsper-day/
[https://perma.cc/WM2V-RFKQ];
USAJOBS,
Clinical
PsychologistCompensation & Pension (C&P), https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/4481690
00/ [https://perma.cc/7HVL-79B8] (last visited Dec. 9, 2018).
56
See Rating Veterans Service Representative, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
https://www.vacareers.va.gov/vacareers/job-search/job-detail.asp?job=03a9ac-ratingveterans-service-representative-los-angeles-ca [https://perma.cc/D4DA-PWM5] (last visited
Aug. 24, 2018).
57
Id.
58
See Adjudicating VA’s Most Complex Disability Claims: Ensuring Quality, Accuracy
and Consistency on Complicated Issues: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Disability
Assistance and Memorial Affairs of the Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 113th Cong. 44 (2013)
(statement of Zach Hearn, Deputy Director for Claims of the American Legion); Addressing
the Backlog: Can the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Manage One Million Claims?:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs of the
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“[a]ssure proper application of the rating schedule and other applicable
instructions.”59 The RVSR is also “fully accountable for proper analysis, appropriate
development, and final rating determinations.”60 If the RVSR determines that the
veteran is “unable to manage his or her own financial affairs” the veteran is deemed
financially “incompetent” for VA purposes and a fiduciary is appointed to manage
the VA’s payment of benefits to the veteran.61 The determination of incompetency
is strictly one of financial incompetence. The RVSR is not required to make a
determination that the veteran is a threat to himself or others or make any
determination regarding the veteran’s ability to enter contracts or manage his affairs
outside the VA’s monetary payment to him.62
1. The Effect of a Judicial Finding of Competence
Determining that a veteran is financially incompetent for VA purposes does not
require a court order of incompetency. In fact, the VA has directed RVSRs that they
are not bound by any judicial determination of competence.63 The VA’s stance on
judicial determinations of competency has created a dichotomy with respect to the
effect of judicial proceedings on a veteran’s competency. For instance, if a court has
previously declared the veteran incompetent, VA internal guidance dictates that the
veteran should not be found competent by the VA unless there is clear and
convincing evidence of competency.64 Additionally, in cases in which a court has
determined the veteran to be incompetent, the VA is not required to provide the
veteran with notice that it will propose a determination of financial incompetency,
and will instead move right to the determination phase.65
On the other hand, if a veteran is found competent by a court, the VA is still
free to declare the veteran financially incompetent, but must first notify the veteran
of this proposed finding (a process known as “proposal of incompetency”) and allow
the veteran to respond.66 This proposal of financial incompetency is meant to serve
as the veteran’s due process and is referred to as such in internal VA guidance to its
employees.67
Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 111th Cong. 52 (2009) (statement of Ian de Planque, Assistant
Director of Veterans Affairs and Rehabilitation Commission for the American Legion).
59
See Rating Veterans Service Representative, supra note 56.
60
Id.
61
What Does VA’s Term ‘Incompetent’ Mean?, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
https://iris.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/2902/~/what-does-va%E2%80%99s-term%E2%80%9Cincompetent%E2%80%9D-mean%3F [https://perma.cc/J2S2-8WC2] (last
visited Aug. 24, 2018).
62
38 C.F.R. § 3.353(a)–(b) (2018).
63
EVALUATING COMPETENCY, supra note 42, § A(1)(b).
64
Id. § A(5)(b).
65
Id. § A(1)(a).
66
Id.
67
Id.
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2. The Standard of Proof for Incompetency
When making a determination that a veteran is financially incompetent, the
RVSR must rely on a “definite expression [of incompetence] by the responsible
medical authorities.”68 In the absence of such expression, the RVSR must find
medical evidence in the veteran’s record that proves by “clear and convincing
evidence” the veteran’s inability to manage his financial affairs.69 The VA’s
definition of “clear and convincing” evidence is problematic. While the legal
definition of clear and convincing evidence requires the fact finder to believe the
evidence is sufficient to make it highly probable that a claim is true, the legal
definition also acknowledges that the “finder of fact may still harbor doubts of
unlikely bases.”70 In contrast, the VA has created its own definition of “clear and
convincing” that is more stringent than the regularly used legal definition and has
published this definition in the VA’s Adjudication Procedures Manual (the
“Manual”), which the RVSRs use to administer the claims process. In the Manual,
the VA requires that, in order to find a veteran financially incompetent, the evidence
of financial incompetency in a veteran’s record be “clear, convincing, and leave[]
no doubt as to the beneficiary’s incompetency.”71 This standard appears again in the
companion regulation upon which this portion of the Manual is based.72 This
direction is clear: To find a veteran financially incompetent, there must be no doubt
that the veteran is actually financially incompetent. However, the Manual and the
regulation also offer contradictory guidance by directing RVSRs to find competence
where there is “reasonable doubt” concerning a veteran’s “mental capacity.”73 The
VA defines reasonable doubt as “one which exists because of an approximate
balance of positive and negative evidence which does not satisfactorily prove or
disprove the [allegation]. It is a substantial doubt and one within the range of
probability as distinguished from pure speculation or remote possibility . . . .”74 In
other words, if the evidence that a veteran is financially competent is in approximate
balance with evidence that the veteran is financially incompetent, the scale will tip
in favor of the veteran and he will be presumed competent.75

68

Id. § (A)(1)(d); 38 C.F.R. § 3.353(c).
See EVALUATING COMPETENCY, supra note 42, § (A)(1)(d); 38 C.F.R. § 3.353(c).
70
Stephen Michael Sheppard, Clear and Convincing Evidence (Proof by Clear and
Convincing Evidence), in THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY DESK
EDITION, (Lexis).
71
See EVALUATING COMPETENCY, supra note 42, § (A)(1)(d); 38 C.F.R. § 3.353(c).
72
38 C.F.R. § 3.353(c). The specific language of this direction follows: “Unless the
medical evidence is clear, convincing and leaves no doubt as to the person’s incompetency,
the rating agency will make no determination of incompetency without a definite expression
regarding the question by the responsible medical authorities.” Id.
73
See EVALUATING COMPETENCY, supra note 42, § (A)(1)(d); 38 C.F.R. § 3.353(c).
74
38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2001).
75
Id.; 38 C.F.R. § 3.353(c) (2018).
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There are numerous concerns with the VA’s directives requiring its employees
to weigh evidence and burdens of proof in determining the competency of a veteran.
In one directive, if there is no court finding of incompetence, the VA mandates that
there must be “no doubt” that a veteran is financially incompetent in order to find a
veteran financially incompetent.76 It follows logically from the VA’s definition of
“clear and convincing” that if there is any doubt, the veteran should be presumed
competent.77 However, the VA then directs that when the evidence of a veteran’s
competence is in equipoise or raises reasonable doubt, only then does the veteran
receive the presumption of competence.78 The trouble with these two conflicting
directives is exemplified in a case where there are two doctor’s opinions indicating
that a veteran has the mental capacity to handle his own funds and three that show
he does not. Two pieces of evidence favoring a veteran’s competence certainly raise
doubts that the veteran is truly financially incompetent. Under the definition in the
Manual, some doubt exists, and this is enough to presume the veteran competent.
However, under the regulation, the evidence is not in equipoise and therefore the
scale does not tip the benefit of the doubt toward the veteran. Thus, in this
hypothetical situation, the veteran would be found financially incompetent. The
standards “no doubt” and “reasonable doubt” are obviously different. Imagine the
confusion of a VA employee attempting to reconcile this difference. Add to this the
conflicting standard that if a veteran is declared incompetent by a court then the VA
should only find competency if there is clear and convincing evidence of
competency, which is in sharp contrast to only finding financial incompetence if
there is clear and convincing evidence of financial incompetence.79 The fact that no
other regulation or statute authorizes a similar application of the VA’s clear and
convincing evidence standard to determine competency deepens the concern over
the VA’s application of this standard in the process.
Notably, many veterans are navigating this field of “burden of proof” landmines
without the benefit of an attorney.80 The veteran caught in this web of confusing
burdens of proof may be truly behind the eight ball because he cannot hire an
attorney to help him sort through the matter. Without an advocate who can make
sense of these differing legal standards, the veteran is impaired in his ability to help
the VA make the appropriate decision, and the result for a veteran could be
extremely detrimental.
3. The Process of Declaring a Veteran Financially Incompetent
The process for notifying a veteran that the VA has found him financially
incompetent varies, depending upon whether the veteran has previously been
76

See EVALUATING COMPETENCY, supra note 42, § (A)(1)(d); 38 C.F.R. § 3.353(c).
Id.
78
38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2001).
79
See EVALUATING COMPETENCY, supra note 42, § A(5)(b).
80
38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(2) (2018).
77
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adjudicated incompetent by a court. Veterans previously determined incompetent by
the court are not entitled to receive notice that the VA proposes to declare the veteran
financially incompetent.81 In those cases, the VA may immediately declare the
veteran financially incompetent.82
As discussed above, the VA’s notification requirement varies depending upon
whether the veteran has been determined incompetent by a court.83 The VA
considers this notification adequate to fulfill any due process requirements that a
veteran is entitled to before the VA makes a final financial competency
determination.84 This notice includes a relatively short summation of the evidence
the VA relied upon to determine financial incompetency; an explanation regarding
the effect of financial incompetency on payment of awards; a short paragraph that
this determination will affect a veteran’s right to purchase, own, and possess a
firearm; and a list of the rights a veteran has before the final decision is made to
declare the veteran incompetent.85 The rights a veteran is entitled to exercise in this
process include the right to submit evidence of financial competency, request a
personal hearing to present evidence of competency, and to have legal representation
at this hearing.86 A veteran may also present evidence of competency, which may
include medical opinions from physicians or mental health professionals showing
that the veteran is indeed competent to manage his own financial benefits.87 The
veteran then has sixty days to respond to the notice of proposed financial
incompetency before the determination is made final.88
4. The Effects of Declaring a Veteran Incompetent for VA Purposes
When the VA declares a veteran financially incompetent for VA purposes, two
major consequences occur: First, the VA appoints a fiduciary to manage the
veteran’s funds for them.89 This fiduciary is not an employee of the VA and is
usually either a volunteer or a paid fiduciary.90 The VA will consider family
members to serve as fiduciaries first. In the event none are capable or willing to do
so, a paid fiduciary will be appointed.91 The fiduciary must ensure that the funds the
veteran receives from the VA are used to serve the veteran’s needs. The fiduciary’s
81

See EVALUATING COMPETENCY, supra note 42, § A(1)(a).
Id.
83
See discussion infra Section I.B.2.
84
PROCESSING AWARDS, supra note 8, § B(3).
85
Id. § B(3)(a).
86
38 U.S.C. § 5501A (2016).
87
Id. § 5501A(3).
88
38 C.F.R. § 3.103(b)(2) (2018).
89
38 U.S.C. § 5502(a)(1) (2005).
90
Id. § 5502(a).
91
Id.; 38 C.F.R. § 13.58(a) (2018); U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS PENSION &
FIDUCIARY SERV., A GUIDE FOR V.A. FIDUCIARIES (2013), http://benefits.va.gov/fiduciary/
Fid_Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZV9-4DCD].
82
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management of those funds is subject to audit for compliance with this standard.92
While the fiduciary program has been rife with complaints of abuse for several years
and has been the subject of many congressional inquiries and internal reports,93 these
issues fall outside the scope of this Article.94 This Article focuses on the secondary—
and often overlooked—result of a declaration of financial incompetency: The VA
reports these veterans to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as persons
prohibited from possessing, owning, or purchasing a firearm. Part II discusses the
mechanics of this process.
II. FEDERAL FIREARMS LAW: PROHIBITED PERSONS AND THE NICS LIST
A. Becoming a Prohibited Person Under Federal Law and the Meaning
of a “Mental Defective”
An attempt to control access to firearms at the federal level often occurs in
response to a crisis event. The broadest and most effective attempt to prohibit certain
people from shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiving firearms and
ammunition appeared in the Gun Control Act of 1968,95 which categorized certain
individuals as prohibited persons.96 Prohibited persons included, among other
categories, persons who were convicted of crimes punishable by over one year in
prison,97 persons who use or are addicted to a controlled substance,98 and those “who
[have] been adjudicated as a mental defective or who [have] been committed to a
mental institution.”99
92

38 C.F.R. § 13.58(b)(2) (1975).
See, e.g., Legion urges Congress to re-evaluate fiduciary programs, AM. LEGION
(June 17, 2015), https://www.legion.org/veteransbenefits/228250/legion-urges-congress-reevaluate-fiduciary-programs [https://perma.cc/CJ8B-DWA9] (discussing findings by the
American Legion regarding the inefficiencies plaguing the VA’s fiduciary program,
including significant backlogs in adjudication, burdening family members, and stripping
away the constitutional rights of veterans).
94
There are many excellent articles outlining the problems in the fiduciary system. E.g.,
Whitney Bosworth Blazek, Combating Privatization: Modifying the Veterans
Administration Fiduciary Program to Protect Incompetent Veterans, 63 DUKE L.J. 1503
(2014).
95
Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–618, § 922(g), 82 Stat. 1213, 1220 (1968)
(also known as the Federal Gun Control Act and the Safe Streets Act of 1968).
96
EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43040, SUBMISSION OF MENTAL HEALTH
RECORDS TO NICS AND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 1 (2013).
97
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2005).
98
Id. § 922(g)(3).
99
Id. § 922(g)(4). The other categories of prohibited persons in this section include: (1)
those convicted of crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; (2)
fugitives from justice; (3) unlawful users or drug addicts; (4) illegal aliens; (5) dishonorably
discharged veterans; (6) those who renounce United States citizenship; and (7) those subject
to a court order regarding domestic violence. Id.
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In recent years, the definition of a “mental defective” has come to the forefront
of the gun debate as the public attempts to understand how mass murderers have
access to firearms.100 The questions these situations raise about how a person is
determined to be a “mental defective” are the backdrop to any current discussion of
the subject of gun control.
While § 922(g) presumes that a person who has been committed to a mental
institution is prohibited from owning a firearm, much of the case law surrounding
§ 922(g)(4)’s “mental defective” proscriptions revolves around defining the term
“committed to a mental institution.”101 The phrase “adjudicated as a mental
defective” is unclear, and there is little case law to aid in understanding it.
To more fully understand the implementation of the meaning of “adjudicated
as a mental defective,” one must turn to the regulations promulgated by the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (BATFE)—the law enforcement arm
of the DOJ tasked with stopping the illegal trafficking of firearms.102 Specifically,
BATFE has determined that “adjudication as a mental defective” requires a
“determination by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority that a
person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, or mental illness,
incompetency, condition, or disease: (1) Is a danger to himself or to others; or (2)
Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own affairs.”103 Included in this
definition are defendants found mentally insane in a criminal court proceeding and
those who cannot stand trial or are found not guilty due to lack of mental
100

For instance, in 2012, Adam Lanza, who in retrospect demonstrated some type of
mental illness, stole the firearms he used in the Sandy Hook Elementary massacre. See
SARAH HEALY EAGAN ET AL., REP. OF THE OFFICE OF THE CHILD ADVOCATE, SHOOTING AT
SANDY
HOOK
ELEMENTARY
SCHOOL
(2014),
http://www.ct.gov/oca/lib/oca/sandyhook11212014.pdf [https://perma.cc/VPZ2-SHMQ];
James Barron, Nation Reels After Gunman Massacres 20 Children at School in Connecticut,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/nyregion/shootingreported-at-connecticut-elementary-school.html
[https://perma.cc/QUH7-YVAB].
In
another tragic instance, despite Cho Seung-Hui having been found by a court to be an
“imminent danger to himself” due to mental illness, he was not reported to the NICS list
because he was ordered to out-patient counseling. Cho later legally purchased firearms which
he used to kill 32 people on the campus of Virginia Tech in 2007. See Campus killer’s
purchases
apparently
within
gun
laws,
CNN
(Apr.
19,
2007),
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/04/19/gun.laws/index.html?_s=PM:US [https://perma.cc/52
6J-5DE6].
101
Commitment in these cases includes involuntary commitment, but not admission for
observation or voluntary admission to a mental institution. See 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2018)
(“Committed to a mental institution.”). These cases are not the focus of this Article, as these
persons are likely reported to the NICS list through other means than the VA fiduciary
program.
102
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, https://www.atf.gov/
[https://perma.cc/75D7-Y4LJ]. The BATFE is also commonly referred to as the “ATF”
though this Article uses the designation BATFE.
103
27 C.F.R. § 478.11(a) (2018).
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responsibility in military courts-martial.104 The BATFE’s final rule regarding the
implementation of this regulation noted that in 1997, the VA interpreted the phrase
“adjudicated as a mental defective . . . [due to the inability to] manage his or her own
affairs” to include those veterans the VA determined were unable to manage their
benefit payments.105
The VA’s interpretation leads to undesirable situations as the Congressional
Research Service points out:
This regulatory definition of a “mentally incompetent person” does not
include any consideration of whether the person is considered to have a
propensity for violence or is considered a threat to himself or herself or
others. Thus, for example, a veteran who during the determination process
for Veterans Disability Compensation (VDC) indicates that because of a
traumatic brain injury he is experiencing some short-term memory loss
which affects his ability to manage his finances, could be determined to
be “mentally incompetent” even if there is no evidence that this veteran’s
condition would impair his ability to safely own or handle a firearm or that
he is a threat to himself or others.106
No court has examined whether a determination by a VA employee regarding
financial incompetency meets the requirement of a “determination by a court, board,
commission, or other lawful authority.”107
Few courts have made findings regarding whether “a person, as a result of
marked subnormal intelligence, or mental illness, incompetency, condition, or
disease . . . [l]acks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own affairs.”108
Generally, the phrase “adjudicated a mental defective” and its accompanying
regulatory definition “lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own
affairs” have been viewed as being related to someone who is mentally ill or has
been found unfit by a trial court.
For instance, in Tyler v. Hillsdale City Sheriff’s Department, the Sixth Circuit
presumed that those who have been “adjudicated a mental defective” are mentally
ill.109 Similarly, in Keyes v. Lynch, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania presumed that both those “adjudicated as mental a defective” and
those “committed” were within the category of persons considered “mentally ill.”110
104

Id. § 478.11(b).
Definitions for the Categories of Persons Prohibited From Receiving Firearms, 62
Fed. Reg. 34634, 34637 (June 27, 1997) (codified at C.F.R. T. 27, ch. I, subch. M, pt. 178).
106
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44818, GUN CONTROL, VETERANS BENEFITS, AND
MENTAL INCOMPETENCY DETERMINATIONS 12 (2017).
107
27 C.F.R. § 478.11(a) (2014).
108
Id.
109
Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308, 317 (6th Cir. 2014), rehearing
en banc granted, vacated, (Apr. 21, 2015).
110
Keyes v. Lynch, 195 F. Supp. 3d 702, 719–20 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
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In the Fourth Circuit, a judicial determination that a defendant was “mentally
incompetent to the extent that she is unable to understand the nature and
consequences of the proceeding against her or to assist properly in her defense” met
the definition of “adjudicated as a mental defective” because she “lacks the mental
capacity to contract or manage her own affairs.”111 The Ninth Circuit also affirmed
a U.S. District Court decision that the appellant was “adjudicated as a mental
defective” when an Arizona court found him unable to assist in his own defense and
subsequently appointed the appellant a guardian and a conservator.112
The definition of “adjudicated as a mental defective” in the context of inability
to manage one’s financial affairs has not been reviewed by the courts in detail.
However, further discussion of constitutional law issues surrounding the VA’s
policy of reporting financially incompetent veterans as mental defectives and
exploration of the Social Security Administration’s similar proposal to do so sheds
light on the legitimacy of the VA’s interpretation of BATFE’s regulation.
B. Financially Incompetent Veterans Become Prohibited Persons
In response to the shooting of President Ronald Reagan and his assistant James
Brady in a botched assassination attempt in 1981, Congress enacted the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 (the “Brady Act”).113 The Brady Act
required the U.S. Attorney General to create a computerized database of those
persons who were disqualified under the Gun Control Act of 1968.114 This database
is the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS).115 The Brady
Act also required that purchasers of firearms from federal firearms licensees (FFLs)
pass a background check.116 FFLs are people or businesses who manufacture,
import, or deal in firearms or ammunition under a federally required license to
engage in such activity.117 When a person seeking to purchase a firearm does so from
an FFL, the FFL is required to contact the NICS system in order to determine if the
purchaser may be a prohibited person.118 Requiring a background check will, in
theory, allow firearm retail sellers to identify people who are prohibited from owning
or possessing a firearm.119 If the purchaser passes the background check, the
111

United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 420 n. 27 (4th Cir. 2010).
Petramala v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. CV 10-2002-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL 3880826,
at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 2, 2011), aff’d, 481 F. App’x 395 (9th Cir. 2012).
113
Brady Bill Signed Into Law, HISTORY (Aug. 21, 2018) https://www.history.com/thisday-in-history/brady-bill-signed-into-law [https://perma.cc/J8FX-ANGH].
114
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. P.L. 103-159 §103(b), 107 Stat.
1536, 1541 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 925A (2018)).
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Id.
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Id.
117
18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (2005); 18 U.S.C. § 923(a) (2004).
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18 U.S.C. § 922(t) (2005); 27 C.F.R. § 478.102 (2018).
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EDWARD C. LIU ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH. SERV. R43040, SUBMISSION OF MENTAL
HEALTH RECORDS TO NICS AND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 1 (2013).
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transaction may be completed.120 If the purchaser is flagged as a person prohibited
from owning firearms, the FFL must refuse to sell the purchaser a firearm.121
The background check primarily uses information found within the NICS. The
NICS system is maintained by the FBI, which is an arm of the DOJ.122 The FBI,
BATFE, and local and state law enforcement agencies cooperate to maintain the
database.123 NICS draws its data from federal databases and other criminal databases
in order to populate the list of prohibited persons.124
In order to facilitate the NICS’s access to information that may indicate a
person is prohibited from purchasing or possessing firearms, the Brady Act further
directs that the Attorney General “may secure directly from any department or
agency of the United States such information on persons for whom receipt of a
firearm would” be a violation of federal law.125 Once such a request from the
Attorney General is received, the agency must respond with the requested records.126
It is under this provision of the Brady Act that the DOJ required the VA report any
persons of whom the VA is aware may be prohibited from owning firearms under
the provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968.127
In a 2012 memorandum of understanding between the two agencies, the VA
agreed to provide to the DOJ for inclusion in the NICS database the names of “VA
beneficiaries who cannot manage their VA benefits, have been rated ‘incompetent,’
and require the appointment of a fiduciary to help manage their VA funds.”128 These
names are then included in the NICS database as persons prohibited from possessing
or purchasing firearms and ammunition under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(4) as persons who have “been adjudicated as a mental defective.”129
Even before the memorandum of understanding between the agencies was
formally agreed upon, the VA reported financially incompetent veterans to the DOJ.
This process began in November 1998 when the VA provided over 88,000 names of
veterans declared financially incompetent for VA purposes to include in the NICS
database.130 The VA’s contribution to the NICS since that time has increased. By
December 2016, “federal departments and agencies had contributed 173,083 records
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in the NICS index ‘adjudicated mental health’ file, of which the VA contributed
167,815 (98.1%)” of the records.131
While there was some resistance amongst gun rights groups and within
veterans’ circles in the aftermath of the 1998 release of names from the VA to DOJ,
the majority of the media and American public were silent until the enactment of the
NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (NIAA).
C. Due Process and Codification of the ATF Regulations
The NIAA was Congress’s attempt to ensure that the names being submitted to
the NICS database and thus preventing the possession or purchase of firearms were
more accurate, particularly regarding those who had been “adjudicated as a mental
defective.”132 The NIAA requires that anyone adjudicated mentally defective for the
purposes of NICS reporting also be given the opportunity to be heard by a court,
board, commission, or other lawful authority.133 The law also permits persons
adjudicated mentally defective to apply for relief from the firearms prohibitions.134
During the enactment of the NIAA, some gun rights activists feared that the
amendments would make it easier for the FBI to include veterans on the NICS list
because it codified the BATFE regulations—which allowed a “court, board,
commission, or other lawful authority” to decide mental defectiveness—and the
regulations broadened the initial language in the 1968 Gun Control Act that set forth
who could adjudicate mental defectiveness.135 Opponents of the NIAA voiced
concern that this would allow a VA psychiatrist who diagnosed a veteran as being
of some slight harm to himself or others to be considered an appropriate “lawful
authority” and the diagnosis to be an adjudication that would qualify for inclusion
on the NICS list of prohibited persons.136 The Congressional Research Service notes
that while these concerns have not yet been realized, the codification does give the
VA some basis to allow a low-level employee at the regional offices to determine
financial incompetency if they indeed qualify as a “lawful authority.”137
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D. Appealing for Relief from Mental Defect Disability
The NIAA also required that any federal agency making an adjudication of
incompetency provide mechanisms for those declared incompetent to appeal for
relief from the disability.138 While a veteran declared financially incompetent may
appeal the incompetency decision through the normal VA channels (i.e., by filing a
Notice of Disagreement, then appealing to the Board and subsequently to the
CAVC), the VA also created a separate process to comply with the NIAA by which
a veteran may seek relief from being reported to the NICS list under the provisions
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) as a “mental defective.”139 If the veteran is able to prove
that he is financially competent, the VA notifies the veteran that he is being found
competent to manage his VA benefits and sends a request to DOJ to remove the
veteran from the NICS list.140 The VA’s internal procedures manual indicates that
the DOJ takes approximately two months from receipt of the VA’s request to remove
the veteran from the NICS list.141 If the veteran remains financially incompetent for
VA purposes but wants to appeal for relief from the disability that put them on the
NICS list, the VA notifies the veteran that he must provide “clear and convincing
evidence [that] shows the circumstances regarding your disability and your record
and reputation are such that you are not likely to act in a manner dangerous to
yourself or others, and the granting of relief is not contrary to public safety and/or
the public interest.”142 Within thirty days of this notification, the veteran must
provide the VA with a statement from a mental health provider who can assess the
veteran’s mental health over the previous five years and addresses the issue of
whether the veteran currently or in the future may present a danger to himself or
others.143 The veteran must also present medical evidence concerning his mental
health symptoms and his likelihood of dangerousness.144 In addition to these items,
the veteran must provide the VA evidence of his reputation by asking character
witnesses to provide statements demonstrating that the veteran does not have a
reputation for violence and that allowing the veteran to have access to weapons is
not contrary to the public interest.145 Finally, the veteran must provide consent for
the VA to request his criminal history.146 If the veteran has been found competent
by a court, board, or commission, that evidence may also be provided to the VA, but
it is not required.147 The decision to provide relief from the disability is made by a
138
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line-level VA employee and must be approved by a supervisory employee and the
Veteran Service Center Manager. 148 Decisions to deny relief may be appealed to a
federal district court because these decisions are not considered to be related to the
delivery of VA benefits.149
III. A REAL-LIFE VA DETERMINATION OF FINANCIAL INCOMPETENCY
It is instructive at this point to review the facts in a case where the VA found a
veteran financially incompetent, and then reversed its decision, in order to
understand the efficacy of VA determinations. In the course of representing clients
while directing a law school veterans clinical program, the author met JR.150 JR was
an Iraq war veteran and in his mid-twenties when he was medically retired from
military service due to PTSD and a traumatic brain injury (TBI). In 2009, the VA
awarded him a rating of 100 percent disability for his PTSD condition. He was also
awarded a 10 percent rating for the mild TBI. Three years after these decisions, in
2012, the VA regional office conducted a review of JR’s 100 percent rating for
PTSD. The VA sent JR to a C&P examination in March 2012, conducted by a
psychologist who had not previously met JR. The C&P examiner only spent onehour interviewing JR and his wife. In the examiner’s evaluation, he noted:
As a result of the TBI, [JR] becomes easily confused, forgets to pay bills,
and to comprehend and understand statements, at times. His wife has been
handling all of the finances. The veteran requires help with managing
financial affairs due to his memory problems and lingering brain injury
effects. Both his wife and the [patient] agree that his frustration tolerance
is very low and that he can become easily frustrated with financial
statements if he has difficulty comprehending them. Once frustrated, he is
unable to calm himself easily. Once calmer, he is more able to understand
the financial issue. As a result, both of them need to manage his financial
affairs at this time. This is the reason for stating that he is not capable of
solely handling his finances.151
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Based upon this statement by the medical examiner, in May 2012, the VA regional
office notified JR that it proposed to declare him financially incompetent for VA
purposes.152 The VA based its finding on a “definite expression [of incompetence]
by [a] responsible medical authorit[y]”:153
During your VA examination on March 6, 2012 the examiner stated that
you are not capable of handling your financial affairs on the basis that you
become easily confused and frustrated, forgets [sic] to pay bills, and have
a hard time comprehending and understanding statements. Your wife is
currently handling all of the finances. Since there is a definitive finding of
incompetency by a physician in this case, and you are not shown to be able
to manage personal affairs to include disbursement of funds, we propose
to make a determination of incompetency for VA purposes.154
With this proposal, the VA included a cover letter explaining JR’s rights in the
process of a financial incompetency determination.155 With regards to applying for
relief from the disability in order to avoid being reported to the DOJ’s NICS list, the
VA gave JR this advice in the letter:
If we decide that you are unable to handle your VA funds, you may apply
to this regional office for the relief of prohibitions imposed by the Brady
Act with regards to the possession, purchase, receipt, or transportation of
a firearm. Submit your request to the address at the top of this letter on the
enclosed VA Form 21-4138, Statement in Support of Claim. VA will
determine whether such relief is warranted.156
The letter did not instruct JR that he would be required to submit a doctor’s statement
covering the previous five years of his mental health and providing an opinion that
he is not a threat to himself or others, character witness statements, or any of the
other evidence necessary to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he is
not a dangerous person.157
In response to the notification, JR submitted two documents to the VA in July
2012 to rebut the finding that he was financially incompetent to handle the VA
benefits. The first was his own statement disagreeing with the C&P examiner’s
conclusions that JR was easily confused and failed to pay bills. JR explained that his
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wife paid the bills in their household out of convenience and that he routinely made
and accounted for regular and unexpected expenditures of money.158
The second statement submitted was written by JR’s wife. She explained that
JR’s PTSD had the effect of making him hyperaware of every expenditure the family
made, causing JR to pore over financial statements for hours to reconcile any issues
in the budget.159 Specifically, JR’s wife noted that:
[JR] can tell me without any issue exactly how much something should
cost. We had our car windshield replaced recently, and [he] caught an
accidental overcharge which saved us over $100 dollars. He has also
corrected the coffee shop accidentally double-charging a cup of coffee,
something even our credit card company missed. [JR] has no trouble
handling money during routine and non-routine transactions.160
JR also attempted to obtain a statement from his VA psychologist regarding
competency, which took several months. In the author’s experience, this is not an
abnormal occurrence (if a veteran is able to obtain a statement at all).
Despite JR’s and his wife’s statements, in October 2012 the VA regional office
notified JR that he had been declared financially incompetent and began the process
of appointing his wife his fiduciary.161 At this time, JR was also advised that he was
being placed on the NICS list of prohibited persons. In making this determination,
the VA regional office failed to consider the statements of JR and his wife and relied
on the medical examiner’s statement explaining:
[T]he examiner stated that you are not capable of handling your financial
affairs on the basis that you become easily confused and frustrated, forgets
[sic] to pay bills, and have a hard time comprehending and understanding
statements. Your wife is currently handling all of the finances.162
JR, through his pro bono counsel, formally appealed this decision. Along with his
appeal of the finding of financial incompetency, in November 2012, JR was finally
able to provide a letter from his regular treating VA psychologist, “Dr. M.”163 Dr. M
had held approximately thirty treatment sessions with JR up to that point. Dr. M
focused his opinion on whether JR’s behavior posed a threat to the safety of himself
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or others. Dr. M unequivocally stated he had no reason to believe JR would harm
himself or others:
Like many returning Veterans with issues of war related stress and
physical injuries from combat military service, [JR] has occasionally
expressed frustration over certain issues. However, even in cases where
his temper has been triggered, he has never, to my knowledge, mishandled
his anger through aggression or threats of harm to self or others. He has,
in fact, shown good problem solving and redirected his energy into
problem-solving efforts that have shown good results in most instances.
He has shown good frustration tolerance, coping skills, and resiliency in
the face of the challenges of adjusting to civilian life.164
Dr. M went on to discuss in one sentence JR’s ability to handle his own
finances: “In my medical opinion. Mr. [JR] is competent to act as his own fiduciary
agent and does not need to be subjected to the additional stress that appointment of
a financial caregiver would entail.”165
In November 2013, eleven months after receiving Dr. M’s statement, the VA
determined that JR was indeed competent.166 In this decision, the VA spent
considerably more time evaluating the C&P examiner’s opinion contrasting it with
the opinion of Dr. M:
[T]he VA contracted examiner who, while he had the benefit of reviewing
all evidence of record, saw you on just one occasion for the purpose of a
VA mental health exam. Further, the VA contracted examiner explained
his reason for concluding that you were not “solely” competent to manage
your financial matters and that you worked with your spouse in this area.
It was not due to the fact that you weren’t mentally competent to
understand your finances; it was that you often grew frustrated with these
matters and then had to go through a period of calming before you could
continue.167
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The VA continued:
The examiner documented that both you and your wife agreed that you
have a low frustration tolerance and can become easily frustrated with
financial statements. Once frustrated, you found it difficult to calm
yourself. However, once you are able to calm down, this examiner noted
you are more able to understand the financial issue. As a result, both you
and your wife work to manage financial issues. The examiner concluded
that this is the reason he found you not capable of “solely” handling your
finances.168
In this decision, the VA rating official implements an odd “solely capable” standard,
which appears to interpret the standard to require that JR must be the only person
handling his finances in order to be found competent. Admittedly, the meaning of
this new “solely capable” standard is difficult to discern as it does not exist in statute,
regulation, or case law.
Several issues are worth mentioning concerning the totality of the VA’s
decisions regarding financial incompetency in JR’s case. First, the decision to find
JR financially incompetent was based upon the wrong standard. The RVSR
explaining the reason for the financial incompetency decision appears to fail to
comprehend that a declaration that a veteran is unable to handle his own financial
affairs requires either a “definite expression [of incompetence] by a responsible
medical authority” or evidence that is “clear, convincing, and leaves no doubt as to
the person’s incompetency.”169 Neither was present in this case. The RVSR here
admits that the finding of financial incompetency was not based upon JR’s inability
to understand his finances. Instead, the RVSR and the examining medical provider
determined that JR was financially incompetent because he expressed frustration
with paying bills and needed to take a break before he could continue. Indeed, this
hardly seems proof that JR lacked the ability to handle his own finances. By this
standard it seems most Americans would be financially incompetent for VA
purposes.170 Additionally, the finding of financial incompetency was based upon the
fact that his wife sometimes handles the finances as well, which was proof that JR
168
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was not “solely” handling his finances. But there is no requirement that the veteran
handle his finances alone in order to be competent.171 None of the reasons provided
by the VA for declaring JR financially incompetent meet the standards required. Yet,
the RVSR did declare JR financially incompetent and, as a result, JR was reported
to the NICS list and lost his constitutionally protected right to possess firearms.
Second, the VA’s decision that JR was “restored to competency” was not based
upon the actual evidence JR provided the VA regarding his competency to handle
his financial affairs. Specifically, the VA failed to even mention the July 2012
statements of JR and his wife demonstrating JR’s ability to pay bills, etc.172 Instead,
the VA relied solely on the statement of Dr. M, which noted in one sentence that JR
was competent to act as his own fiduciary. The VA also noted that it decided JR was
competent because Dr. M described that “while [JR] [does] or [has] become
frustrated with certain aspects of daily living, [JR] [has] developed problem-solving
skills that have allowed [JR] to work through [his] frustration to allow [him] to fully
comprehend and complete these actions.”173 A well-recognized example of these
coping mechanisms is one of the reasons that the VA declared JR financially
incompetent in the first place: When he gets frustrated, he takes time to calm himself
before returning to his task.174
Third, while the VA eventually declared JR “restored to competency” and
removed him from the fiduciary system, a black cloud still followed him. The VA’s
competency determination made no mention of its subsequent effect on JR’s right
to purchase, transport, or possess a firearm—a subject the VA is required to address
when competency is restored.175 JR had to affirmatively determine that his name had
been removed from the FBI-maintained list of prohibited persons—a process that
took months and required the help of a second attorney who regularly dealt with
NICS legal issues. Additionally, although the VA eventually believed JR’s
“competency [was] restored,”176 if JR is ever asked if he has ever been found
incompetent he may have to disclose his one year of “financial incompetency for
171
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VA purposes.” This is because, even though the VA’s decision of financial
incompetency violated the VA’s own standards of proof in the first place, the VA
did not negate the initial finding of financial incompetency. It only declared that JR
was “restored to competency” after a period of financial incompetency.
Fourth, JR was deprived of his constitutional right under the Second
Amendment to own or purchase a firearm for one year without judicial review of the
deprivation.
Fifth, during the “adjudication” of JR’s financial incompetency, the VA never
considered whether he was a danger to himself or others. In fact, the finding of
financial incompetency was not based upon his PTSD—which has been referred to
by proponents of the VA’s incompetence determination policy as a mental
illness177—but rather on the brain injury symptoms, which the VA considered to be
so minor they warranted only a 10 percent rating of disability. JR is not the only
veteran to have been adjudicated based on reasons unrelated to mental illness.
During debate on the House Floor regarding the VA’s policy of reporting
incompetent veterans to the NICS list, Jennifer—the wife of a veteran named Corey,
who experienced difficulties similar to those of JR—wrote a letter explaining the
situation:
[Corey] was severely injured by an IED explosion in 2004, which caused
severe burns, damage to his lungs, and severe traumatic brain injury after
shrapnel entered his skull. Corey spent . . . 5 years recovering from his
injuries. Jennifer reports that he is walking, talking, and enjoying life at
home with his two children.
Now it gets really sad. Because of his head injury, Corey still requires
help with certain things. The VA said he needed help managing his
disability compensation payments, and they named Jennifer, his spouse,
as his fiduciary . . . .
On May 19, 2009, we had our annual fiduciary meeting with the VA
field examiner. At the end of the meeting, our field examiner said he
needed to read a statement to us. He read the Brady Bill statement and
then stated that Corey can’t own, possess, use, be around, et cetera, any
firearms. He then went on to say that anyone in our household can’t own
a gun while living in this household.
I asked him about Corey going on adaptive hunting trips and he said
he couldn’t. Corey stated that he had a gun that was handed down from
his grandfather and that Corey was going to hand it down to his son, and
the field examiner told him that he couldn’t have it. He stated to Corey
that if he did own a gun or be around a gun that he would be threatened
with imprisonment.
The way that that field examiner talked to Corey about this issue was
not appropriate. The field examiner said that I could challenge it and
177
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handed me a blank sheet of paper with a VA heading. I asked the field
examiner for the statement that he read to me, but he said that he had to
ask his boss if he could actually provide a copy of that statement. After 2
weeks of me emailing him, I finally got the attached papers in the mail.178
Finally, one can imagine that the process to restore JR’s constitutional rights
would have taken much longer if JR had not had an attorney working on the issue.
The VA made very clear in its proposal letter that if JR wanted help clearing up the
financial incompetency issue, he was prohibited from hiring an attorney to help him
with his rebuttal but could rely on either a VSO or pro bono attorney. JR happened
to have the help of a pro bono legal clinic at a law school when the VA issued its
proposal.179 In contrast, most veterans whom the VA proposes to be financially
incompetent fight the battle on their own, suffer being declared financially
incompetent, and then appeal before they are permitted to hire an attorney. Indeed,
even with a law clinic helping JR gather evidence, the VA failed to consider the
statements JR and his wife made concerning his financial competency when
deciding whether he was financially incompetent.180
Concerns with the VA’s current system have arisen recently in two different
legislative settings: (1) a proposal that Social Security adopt a substantially similar
method for reporting financially incompetent payees to the NICS list; and (2) a
proposal to prevent the VA from continuing their current practice of reporting
financially incompetent veterans. Using the example of the VA’s declaration of
financial incompetency as a background for examining these congressional actions
is instructive.
IV. FEDERAL LEGISLATION REGARDING FINANCIAL INCOMPETENCY
DETERMINATIONS
A. The 21st Century Cures Act
In December 2016, Congress passed the 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act).181
The Cures Act concerned several different medical issues ranging from
pharmaceutical approval to health care delivery.182 Buried within the text of the
Cures Act was the VA’s regulation regarding the rights of a veteran subject to a
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determination of financial incompetency by the VA.183 While the codification is not
a word-for-word copy of the existing VA regulation, the statute provides the same
standards for notice and opportunity to be heard, including the presentation of
evidence regarding financial incompetence.184 The language of the Cures Act also
does not specifically mention firearm rights or determinations of the dangerousness
of the veteran.185 Instead, it merely codifies existing procedure at the VA for
determinations of financial incompetency.186
There is one interesting addition in the statute that is absent from the preexisting
regulation. That is the addition of the words “including by counsel” when discussing
the veteran’s right to be represented at a hearing during the proposal for financial
incompetency.187 As this hearing is in the proposal phase (i.e., notice phase) of the
financial incompetency determination, the statutory ban on veterans hiring paid
attorneys in the VA process applies.188 There was no discussion on the floor of the
House or Senate regarding the inclusion of this language or an acknowledgment that
veterans are not permitted to hire a lawyer at this stage in proceedings.189
B. Social Security Administration Prohibited from Reporting Incompetent Payees
in a Manner Similar to the VA
During the FBI’s initial rollout of NICS, the SSA reviewed its procedures and
concluded that a determination that a Social Security beneficiary needed a
representative to handle his or her money did not justify a mental incompetency
determination for the purposes of gun control.190 However, in 2013, DOJ informed
the SSA that Social Security beneficiaries with representative payees must be
reported to the NICS list due to the beneficiaries’ inability to manage their own
affairs.191 In 2016, the SSA solicited comments before promulgating a final rule in
183
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December 2016 that would require the SSA to report payees deemed incompetent
for purposes of managing SSA funds to the NICS list.192 The SSA’s proposed rule
required both a determination that the payee deemed incompetent could not handle
his own SSA payment, and a determination that the beneficiary suffered from a
primary diagnosis of a mental impairment and was between the ages of eighteen and
sixty-six.193 Like the VA’s procedures, no determination was to be made as to the
beneficiary’s threat of harm to himself or others.194 The SSA’s Inspector General
estimated that 81,000 beneficiaries would have been affected by this rule and
reported to the NICS list as prohibited persons.195 This number is far shy of the VA’s
reporting of more than 160,000 veterans to the NICS system.196 In December 2016,
the SSA promulgated the final rule.197
In early 2017, Congress began to debate the wisdom of this rule. The arguments
for and against the SSA rule on the House Floor were instructive. Proponents of a
joint resolution vacating the rule opposed painting those with a mental health
disorder requiring a representative payee as somehow violent.198 Numerous
organizations submitted letters supporting the Joint Resolution.199 For instance, the
National Council on Disability, the independent agency which advises Congress and
the President on disability policy, commented:
[T]here is, simply put, no nexus between the inability to manage
money and the ability to safely and responsibly own, possess or use a
firearm. This arbitrary linkage not only unnecessarily and unreasonably
deprives individuals with disabilities of a constitutional right, it increases
the stigma for those who, due to their disabilities, may need a
representative payee[.]200
Similarly, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) opposed the SSA rule
because “[t]here is no data to support a connection between the need for a
representative payee to manage one’s Social Security disability benefits and a
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propensity toward gun violence.”201 The ACLU also worried that a determination by
the “SSA line staff” that a beneficiary was unable to manage an SSA payment was
not an “‘adjudication’ in any ordinary meaning of the word. Nor is it a determination
that the person ‘[l]acks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own
affairs.’”202
The lack of due process granted to payees desiring to appeal the restriction on
their gun rights was also a concern. Representative Bob Goodlatte noted:
[T]he appeals process is severely flawed because it puts the burden on
individuals to prove that restoring their Second Amendment rights would
not pose a danger to public safety or be contrary to the public interest. In
every other instance in which someone is facing a loss of his ability to
possess a firearm, the burden is on the government to prove that the
individual should have his right taken away.203
Those who supported the SSA rule noted that this rule would only affect those
who had a mental health condition so disabling that the beneficiary could not work.
Representative Mike Thompson noted that “[t]hese are not people just having a bad
day. These are not people simply suffering from depression or anxiety or
agoraphobics. These are people with a severe mental illness who can’t hold any kind
of job or make any decisions about their affairs.”204 The debate on the Senate Floor
was substantially similar to that of the House.205 In February 2017, Congress passed
and President Trump signed a joint resolution prohibiting SSA from implementing
the rule and reporting incompetent beneficiaries to the NICS list.206
C. The Veterans 2nd Amendment Protection Act
In 2008, Congress—lead by Senator Richard Burr of North Carolina—began
introducing and failing to pass legislation meant solely to prevent the VA from
reporting financially incompetent veterans as those “adjudicated as a mental
defective” to the NICS list.207
On March 16, 2017, the House passed H.R. 1181, referred to as “The Veterans
2nd Amendment Protection Act.”208 H.R. 1181 prohibited the VA from reporting
201

163 CONG. REC. H898 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2017) (letter from American Civil Liberties
Union, (Feb. 1, 2017)).
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veterans deemed financially incompetent for VA purposes to the FBI NICS list as
prohibited persons.209 In particular, the proposed additions to Section 55 of Title 38
read:
§ 5501B. Conditions for treatment of certain persons as adjudicated
mentally incompetent for certain purposes
Notwithstanding any determination made by the Secretary under
section 5501A of this title, in any case arising out of the administration by
the Secretary of laws and benefits under this title, a person who is mentally
incapacitated, deemed mentally incompetent, or experiencing an extended
loss of consciousness shall not be considered adjudicated as a mental
defective under subsection (d)(4) or (g)(4) of section 922 of title 18
without the order or finding of a judge, magistrate, or other judicial
authority of competent jurisdiction that such person is a danger to himself
or herself or others.210
The debate surrounding this legislation is instructive as it encompasses the vast
majority of concerns often raised in the public—from those in favor of abolishing
the VA’s current practices to those who wish them to remain in place. They are also
quite similar to the concerns on both sides raised during the debate vacating Social
Security’s almost identical final rule. Notably missing from this debate are the voices
of organizations, including the ACLU, who came out strongly against the SSA’s
attempt to report American citizens to the NICS list based upon a staff employee’s
determination of financial incompetence.
Opponents of H.R. 1181 argued that more time was needed to determine the
effects of the bill on those already included on the NICS list through this process.
Representative Elizabeth Esty argued that one of the main concerns of altering this
process is that while she agrees these determinations are overinclusive,211 there are
veterans who are legitimately mentally ill being captured by financial incompetency
adjudications:
To be clear, of the 170,000 veterans currently prohibited from owning
a firearm, as of 2015, almost 20,000 of them were diagnosed with
schizophrenia, over 11,000 with dementia, and over 5,000 with
Alzheimer’s. For a veteran suffering with a significant mental health
condition like one of these, access to a firearm is a serious matter.212

209

Id.
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Representative Esty went on to argue that some of these mentally ill people may be
a harm to themselves or others, and inclusion on the NICS list is necessary to prevent
suicides.213
Concern about the potential for veterans considered financially incompetent by
the VA to commit suicide is the overarching theme of the opponents of H.R. 1181.
This concern was mentioned by the bill’s opponents over twenty times on the House
Floor during its debate.214 Suicide is also the primary concern of every letter
submitted in the Congressional Record of the debate by those opposed to altering
the VA’s reporting procedures.215
It is also clear from comments made on the House Floor that some opponents
of H.R. 1181 erroneously believe that the VA determinations of financial
incompetency are being made by physicians familiar with the veteran’s situation and
are primarily targeting those veterans with serious mental illness. For instance,
Representative Ami Bera notes, “I don’t want to take doctors out of this process . . . .
We need to continue to allow doctors to report the risks when they see them. It makes
their patients safer, their communities safer, and it is the right thing to do.”216 In the
same vein, Representative Thompson remarked that “[t]he VA has done a good job
to keep more than 174,000 veterans with serious mental health problems from
getting a gun . . . . This bill would make it easier for veterans to take their own
life.”217
Proponents of the bill prohibiting the VA from sharing the names of those
appointed a fiduciary to the NICS list argue that concerns about the propensity for
harming oneself are not allayed by a financial incompetency determination.
Opponents of this bill argue that dangerous or suicidal veterans could
have easy access to guns if this VA process is stopped. However, the
program does not make any determination on veterans’ mental health or
the dangers they pose to others. The VA system focuses only on whether
veterans receive assistance with their finances.218
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help keep firearms out of the hands of veterans who are at serious risk of harming themselves
or others is dangerous and misguided”).
214
163 CONG. REC. H2102–13 (2017).
215
Id.
216
163 CONG. REC. H2106–07 (2017) (statement of Rep. Bera).
217
163 CONG. REC. H2107 (2017) (statement of Rep. Thompson).
218
163 CONG. REC. H2106 (2017) (statement of Rep. Lamborn).

34

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

Concerns that the VA employee making the financial incompetency
determination is not proficient enough to make these determinations were raised by
Representative Mike Bost who noted that currently “they can’t even have a judge or
a doctor make that decision . . . . This legislation still allows for dangerous
individuals to be denied their firearms, but it leaves the determination to someone
with the expertise to understand their case.”219
Proponents also expressed concern that the process for stripping veterans of
their gun rights is less stringent than the consideration given to other groups of
prohibited persons. For instance, Representative Phil Roe argued:
It is outrageous that the only group of people that can have their
constitutional rights taken away without a hearing before a judge or
magistrate are the very people who fought for those rights and [for] their
dependents. Even criminals must be convicted in a court of law before
their names are added to that list.220
The argument was also raised that the VA’s current process of reporting those
in need of fiduciaries to the NICS list is overinclusive and requires a higher burden
to be removed from the list than there is to be included.221
Opponents of H.R. 1181 argued that the bill would require the DOJ to remove
immediately those names on the NICS list provided by the VA who do not have a
court adjudication of mental defectiveness.
The fact of the matter is that, should H.R. 1181 be signed into law, it
would need to be read together with the NICS Improvement Amendments
Act of 2007, which requires—requires—Federal agencies to update the
records they have previously shared with NICS, meaning, should this bill
pass, the VA would be required to remove the 170,000 records they have
previously shared with NICS since none of those were approved by a
court, nor did they meet the new standard established by this bill.222
However, the proponents of the bill have stated on the Floor that the bill will have
no effect on those veterans already included on the NICS list through this process.
As Representative Phil Roe noted:
The text of this bill does not remove the names of anyone who is
currently on the NICS list. It simply prohibits the VA Secretary from
continuing to send the names of beneficiaries who utilize a fiduciary to the
219
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NICS list. And there is nothing in the bill that would require the VA
Secretary to take any action with respect to those already on the list.223
H.R. 1181 passed the House of Representatives on March 16, 2017, by a roll
call vote (240–175).224 To date, the Senate of the 115th Congress has not considered
a sister bill.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS AND THE
APPLICATION OF § 922(G) TO THE VA’S DETERMINATION OF FINANCIAL
INCOMPETENCY
The VA’s actions depriving veterans of their Second Amendment rights has the
potential to impact a number of constitutional considerations. This Article considers
whether the finding of “financial incompetence for VA purposes” passes
constitutional scrutiny as an adjudication that the veteran has been “adjudicated as a
mental defective” under § 922(g).
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution225 has been a part of
America’s historical fabric since 1791. However, it was not until 2008 that the
United States Supreme Court, in District of Columbia v. Heller, clarified that the
Constitutional right was an individual right.226 Prior to Heller, whether the right to
possess firearms applied to citizens in the collective for militia purposes, or applied
to each citizen as an individual right, was an issue undecided by the Supreme Court
and thus open to interpretation in all other state and federal courts.227 Heller, in a
majority opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, held that the Second Amendment
conferred an individual right to possess firearms, regardless of participation in a
militia.228 Although the Court declared the Second Amendment to be an individual
right, that did not mean that the right was unlimited. The Court indicated that some
“long-standing prohibitions” such as restriction on the rights of criminals or the
mentally ill to possess firearms would not be negated by the Heller decision.229
Although Heller and the Court’s subsequent case, McDonald v. City of
Chicago,230 clarified that the Second Amendment created an individual right and
was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s incorporation
doctrine, they did not decide the level of scrutiny courts should give to restriction of
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this right.231 While the Court declined to define a specific level of scrutiny applicable
to infringements on the right to bear arms, the Court did dismiss the use of a “rational
basis” level of scrutiny when considering “the extent to which a legislature may
regulate a specific, enumerated right.”232 After these two Supreme Court decisions,
lower level courts have been grappling with the level of scrutiny to apply to
restrictions imposed on gun owners in various situations ranging from prohibitions
on open-carry laws233 to restrictions on ownership of specific types of firearms.234
A. The Two-Step Process
In light of Heller’s ambiguity concerning the level of scrutiny courts should
apply when evaluating restrictions on the right to possess firearms, appellate courts
have stepped into the breach and created a framework for analyzing these situations.
In 2010, the Third Circuit decided the case U.S. v. Marzzarella, applying a twostep process for determining the constitutionality of restrictions in light of Heller.235
In Marzzarella, the appellant was indicted and convicted for possession of a firearm
with an obliterated serial number, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k).236 He appealed
and argued that § 922(k), as applied to his particular situation, violated his Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms under Heller.237 When considering
Marzzarella’s appeal, the Third Circuit interpreted Heller to provide a two-pronged
approach to determine the constitutionality of a firearms restriction:
As we read Heller, it suggests a two-pronged approach to Second
Amendment challenges. First, we ask whether the challenged law imposes
a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s
guarantee. If it does not, our inquiry is complete. If it does, we evaluate
the law under some form of means-end scrutiny. If the law passes muster
under that standard, it is constitutional. If it fails, it is invalid.238
The first prong, determining “whether the challenged law imposes a burden on
conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee,” requires
an historical analysis of the action being regulated to determine if it is historically
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an action that was protected by the Second Amendment.239 The second prong
requires the court to weigh the government action against the constitutional right the
action curtails.240 This is often referred to as applying a level of scrutiny. While the
level of scrutiny applied to these challenges varies from court to court, for the most
part the other federal circuits have adopted the Third Circuit’s two-prong approach
to analyzing challenges to firearm restrictions.241
1. First Prong: “Imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the
Second Amendment’s Guarantee”
Considering whether the conduct being regulated falls outside the scope of the
Second Amendment has been recently separated into two steps.242 The first is to
review whether ownership of weapons under the circumstance in question was
contemplated by the Second Amendment.243 The second step looks at whether the
individual can differentiate his circumstances from the circumstances being
regulated.244
The historical inquiry of the first prong, a review of whether ownership of
weapons under this circumstance was contemplated by the Second Amendment, is
often murky and leads to inconclusive results. One scholar has noted that more often
the inquiry of constitutionality “winds up turning more on the second step than the
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first. Historical analysis does not provide clear answers to most of the difficult
Second Amendment issues that courts face today, and history therefore continues to
take an inevitable backseat to practical policy considerations.”245
For example, the Marzzarella court could not make the determination as to
whether possessing unmarked firearms in the home was protected under the Second
Amendment, so instead moved on to the second prong of the inquiry finding that
even if owning such firearms was within the scope of the Second Amendment, the
government action passed muster under intermediate scrutiny.246
Determining the historical application of the Second Amendment to the
mentally ill has been equally muddied. When attempting to argue that the specific
conduct regulated falls outside the protection of the Second Amendment, it is in the
government’s best interests to establish that the regulation of possession by the
mentally ill was something considered at the time the Second Amendment was
ratified.247 If the mentally ill were not permitted to own firearms at that time, then
the common law right to possession for these people did not exist and there are no
Second Amendment rights to enforce.248 In that case, “the regulated activity is
categorically unprotected, and the law is not subject to further Second Amendment
review.”249 Notably, some courts have considered laws restricting firearm
possession similar to the “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” mentioned in
Heller, such as restrictions on the rights of criminals or the mentally ill, to
automatically survive Second Amendment scrutiny.250 However, other circuits have
noted that “[t]his approach . . . approximates rational-basis review, which has been
rejected by Heller” and require the two-prong test to be completed.251
245
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Courts undertaking the task of excavating the historical record for indications
that possession of firearms by the mentally ill was in place at the time of ratification
of the Second Amendment are few and far between in the aftermath of Heller. Most
of the cases that have discussed the mentally ill have done so in regards to the second
prohibition of § 922(g)(4) applying to those “committed to a mental institution” as
opposed to those “adjudicated as a mental defective.”252 Three cases have
specifically looked at § 922(g)(4) after Heller and Marzzarella, two of which are
applicable here.253
In Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Department, a panel of the Sixth Circuit
reviewed § 922(g)(4)’s prohibition on those who have been “committed to a mental
institution.”254 In Keyes v. Lynch, another case involving commitment, the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania undertook an extensive
analysis of prohibitions on possession by the mentally ill using Tyler and the other
post-Marzzarella cases as its guide.255 In the historical exploration required for step
one of the first prong, both the Tyler and Keyes courts discussed that laws restricting
the possession of firearms by the mentally ill are not found in America until the
twentieth century around 1930 and then again in 1968.256 However, the Keyes court
acknowledged, along with other courts, that all the prohibitions in § 922(g) were
generally crafted to “keep firearms out of the hands of presumptively ‘risky
people.’”257 In Keyes, the government argued that “there is historical documentation
of disarmament of persons ‘perceived to be dangerous,’ which . . . includes as a

775 F.3d 308, 324 (6th Cir. 2014), rehearing en banc granted, vacated, (Apr. 21, 2015).
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subset the mentally ill.”258 The government pointed to the notes from state ratifying
conventions cited in the Heller case which indicate that “the common law right to
keep and bear arms did not extend to those who were likely to commit violent
offenses.”259 Despite this discussion, the Keyes court noted that “there does not
appear to be a specific mention of mentally ill individuals and the extent to which
this concern over propensity for violence applied to them.”260
However, despite the failure of legislation to historically restrict the mentally
ill from possessing firearms, the Keyes court held that
while there is little historical evidence of mentally ill people being subject
to laws specifically disarming them, there is a clear history in this country
of the institutionalization of persons with severe mental illness or mental
illness that made the afflicted persons dangerous. Obviously,
institutionalized persons have not as a general rule been permitted to
possess firearms. Also, we find there is clear historical evidence that
persons prone to violent behavior were outside the scope of Second
Amendment protection. Further, to the extent that there is documented
evidence regarding the justifications underlying § 922(g)(4), it appears
that this statute subsection was likely animated by the same concerns that
justified the felon gun dispossession statute subsection in § 922(g)(1), as
elaborated upon in Barton. That is, the concern that certain individuals,
whether those with felonies or those with mental illness, were too
irresponsible or too dangerous to be trusted with firearms.261
In contrast to the Keyes court’s view that the whole of § 922(g)(4) addressed
mental illness, the Tyler court assumed it was a given that the portion prohibiting
those “adjudicated as a mental defective” addressed those suffering from a mental
illness, which it determined was certainly historically prohibited from owning
firearms.262 Interestingly, the Tyler court required more evidence that someone
“committed to a mental institution” was in fact mentally ill:
We are not aware of any other historical source that suggests that the
right to possess a gun was denied to persons who had ever been committed
to a mental institution, regardless of time, circumstance, or present
condition.
We need not reinvent the wheel and justify with historical reasoning
§ 922(g)(4)’s prohibition on possession of firearms by the mentally ill. So
much we may take for granted. Heller has already sanctioned the
“longstanding prohibitio[n] on the possession of firearms by . . . the
258
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mentally ill” as permissible. The Court did not directly support this
statement with citations. Justice Breyer suggested that the Court’s
statement amounted to “judicial ipse dixit.” The Court, in turn, responded
that “there will be time enough to expound upon the historical
justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those
exceptions come before us.”
The problem, as noted, is that the class of individuals constituting
those ever previously mentally institutionalized is not identical to the class
of individuals presently mentally ill. Ultimately, the government cannot
establish that § 922(g)(4) regulates conduct falling outside the scope of
the Second Amendment as it was understood in 1791. We cannot
conclude, then, that the regulated activity is “categorically
unprotected.”263
Because the Tyler court found that restrictions on persons committed to mental
institutions were not something that historically fell outside the protection of the
Second Amendment, it did not move on to the second step of the first prong.264 The
Keyes court, however, finding that historically those who were institutionalized had
no access to weapons, did address the second step.265
If the conduct considered falls outside the protection of the Second
Amendment, the second step of the first prong requires the appellant to “present
facts about himself and his background that distinguish his circumstances from those
of persons in the historically barred class.”266 The Third Circuit, in Binderup, a case
involving § 922(g)(1)’s felon prohibition, explained the burden on the prohibited
person to distinguish himself from those historically barred from the Second
Amendment’s protections in this example:
These facts must speak to the traditional justifications that legitimize the
class’s disability. In Barton we noted at least two ways of doing this: (1)
“a felon convicted of a minor, non-violent crime might show that he is no
more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen,” or (2) “a court might
find that a felon whose crime of conviction is decades-old poses no
continuing threat to society.”267

263

Id. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, 722, 635; United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510,
518 (6th Cir. 2012)).
264
Id. at 322.
265
Keyes v. Lynch, 195 F. Supp. 3d 702, 719–21 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
266
Binderup v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 365–66 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing United
States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2011)).
267
Id.

42

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

While the Binderup court was considering a different prohibition of § 922(g),
the implications are readily transferable to an evaluation of § 922(g)(4). The Keyes
court applied this standard in its case concerning the rights of a person previously
committed by allowing the appellant to demonstrate that:
he is “no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen,” or that he
“poses no continuing threat to society.” And if he has made such a
showing, then his ability to possess a firearm “for protection of hearth and
home is not just conduct protected by the Second Amendment, it is the
core of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”268
Ultimately, the Keyes court found that the appellant had distinguished his own
circumstances from those mentally ill persons who are prohibited from owning
weapons.269 For instance, the appellant had only one commitment—at age fifteen—
because he was a danger to himself.270 Since that time and in his adulthood, he had
no further findings of dangerousness or commitment, had served in the military, had
been employed as a state corrections officer and issued a firearm, and had his
commitment expunged from his record after a court found that he no longer suffered
from a mental condition and did not pose a danger to himself or others.271 Based
upon this evidence, the court found that the appellant “has shown that he is ‘no more
dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen’ at this point in his life, [and] that he
‘poses no continuing threat to society.’”272 Thus, Second Amendment protections
applied to him.273
2. The Second Prong: Scrutiny of the Governmental Restriction
In some cases, the first prong of the two-step test resolves the issue and the
court finds that the regulated conduct falls outside the protection of the Second
Amendment. Thus, any regulation of the activity is permitted.274 However, if the
individual can demonstrate that the conduct being prohibited by the government was
originally protected under the Second Amendment or that the individual’s
circumstances are so different from the historically prohibited category that the
Second Amendment protections should apply to him, the court moves to the second
prong of the Marzzarella test.275
268

Keyes, 195 F. Supp. 3d at 720.
Id. at 722.
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Id. at 720–21.
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Id. at 722.
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See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that
the regulation would pass constitutional muster, no matter how burdensome, because the
activity did not fall within the scope of original intent of the Second Amendment).
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The second prong of the test requires the court to apply a level of scrutiny to
the government action in order to determine if the restriction on the right to possess
weapons is constitutional.276 The Court in Heller mandated that rational basis
scrutiny was inappropriate, which leaves the courts to apply either intermediate or
strict scrutiny.277 Intermediate scrutiny requires that a challenged law circumscribing
constitutional rights “must be substantially related to an important governmental
objective.”278 Strict scrutiny, on the other hand, analyzes restrictions on
constitutional rights by requiring that the government show the restriction “furthers
a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”279
Determining which standard to apply has led to a split in the circuit courts
although all the courts have agreed that some heightened scrutiny must apply.280
However, the majority of courts has stopped short of applying a strict standard and
have instead applied an intermediate scrutiny standard to government action
regulating Second Amendment rights.281 It appears that many of these circuits use
the Marzzarella case as the yardstick for which scrutiny to apply. In Marzzarella,
the Third Circuit cautioned against the use of strict scrutiny in all cases concerning

appellant to be unconstitutional based upon his distinguishing himself from the category of
those historically prohibited from possessing firearms. The court should have moved on to
the second prong of the Marzzarella test and used some form of scrutiny to determine if the
restrictions on the defendant were valid. See Binderup v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 353
(3d Cir. 2016) (“In sum, the Challengers have carried their burden of showing that their
misdemeanors were not serious offenses despite their maximum possible punishment. This
leads us to conclude that Binderup and Suarez have distinguished their circumstances from
those of persons historically excluded from the right to arms. That, in turn, requires the
Government to meet some form of heightened scrutiny at the second step of the Marzzarella
framework.”).
276
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 95.
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District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008).
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Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
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Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (citation
omitted).
280
Binderup, 836 F.3d at 344; see also Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97–101 (applying
intermediate scrutiny and, in the alternative, strict scrutiny to § 922(k)’s prohibition on
possession of any firearm with a destroyed serial number); United States v. Williams, 616
F.3d 685, 692–93 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(1)); United
States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying intermediate scrutiny
to § 922(g)(9)’s disarmament of a domestic-violence misdemeanant); United States v.
Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682–83 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny to §
922(g)(9)); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 802–05 (applying intermediate scrutiny to
§ 922(g)(8)’s dispossession of certain persons subject to a domestic restraining order); Tyler
v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308, 326–29 (6th Cir. 2014) (applying strict
scrutiny to § 922(g)(4)’s dispossession of any person “who has been committed to a mental
institution”), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Apr. 21, 2015).
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Rostron, supra note 245, at 820.
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the Second Amendment noting that “[s]trict scrutiny does not apply automatically
any time an enumerated right is involved. We do not treat First Amendment
challenges that way.”282
When it determined which level of scrutiny was appropriate regarding the
firearm prohibition on persons who were committed to a mental institution, the Tyler
court noted that the difference between strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny is
based more on theoretical variance than on a real difference. The court noted that
“strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny can take on different forms in different
contexts that are sometimes colloquially referred to as, for example, strict-scrutinylight or intermediate-scrutiny-plus or the like.”283 While the courts acknowledge that
these levels of scrutiny vary according to who is applying them and in what situation
they are used, it appears that the majority of courts applying intermediate scrutiny
merely require the government to show that the aims of the government are
important and that the means are substantially related to those goals.284
There are only two courts post-Heller that have upheld a constitutional
challenge to § 922(g)’s firearm restrictions under either form of scrutiny: Tyler and
Binderup.285 Both these courts determined these cases on an “as-applied basis” as
opposed to a facial challenge to the statute.286
The Tyler court, acknowledging it was in the minority when applying strict
scrutiny, found that § 922(g)(4) was unconstitutional as applied to the appellant, who
had been committed to a mental institution as a juvenile and had never had another
commitment or encounter with the law.287 When considering the government’s
282

Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96.
Tyler, 775 F.3d at 323 (en banc), reh’g granted, opinion vacated (Apr. 21, 2015);
Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting
Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 2011) n.8
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
284
Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980).
285
The Fourth Circuit in Kolbe v. Hogan did uphold a constitutional challenge using
strict scrutiny to Maryland’s 2013 ban on semi-automatic weapons, but that case did not
interpret § 922(g). Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 192 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc), reh’g
granted, 636 F. App’x 880 (4th Cir. 2016), on reh’g, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017).
286
A facial challenge would purport that the prohibitions of § 922(g) would be
unconstitutional in any application. As-applied challenges argue that due to a plaintiff’s
particular circumstances, the application of the otherwise valid law becomes an
unconstitutional restriction on rights. For purposes of this article it is acknowledged that a
facial attack on § 922(g)(4)’s prohibitions is unlikely to be successful, particularly in light of
the case law regarding § 922(g)’s prohibitions generally. There are people who have been
adjudicated a mental defective who are validly included on the NICS list and prohibited from
owning firearms. There are also veterans who are declared incompetent by the VA because
they were adjudicated mentally incompetent by a court and are reported to the NICS list. It
is those veterans who have not been adjudicated a “mental defective” by a court but are only
found to be financially incompetent by the VA who are the focus of this Article. Therefore,
as-applied challenges will be considered here.
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The Tyler court makes a rigorous assessment of the choices of scrutiny of the other
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interest, the court in Tyler found that the difference between the strict scrutiny
requirement of a “compelling interest” and the intermediate scrutiny requirement of
an “important interest” was “unlikely to be relevant to gun controls, since virtually
every gun control law is aimed at serving interests that would usually be seen as
compelling—preventing violent crime, injury, and death.”288 In Tyler, the
government argued that the two interests of the government served by the
prohibitions of § 922(g)(4) were to prevent suicides and crimes, both of which the
court agreed were compelling.289 The court then reviewed whether the government’s
restriction on the Second Amendment right was narrowly tailored to serve this
interest. The court noted:
Based on Heller, a law forbidding possession of firearms by “the
mentally ill” is most likely constitutional and satisfies narrow tailoring. A
law that captures only a small subset of that group, or a law that captures
the entire group but also a significant number of non-mentally ill persons,
would fail narrow tailoring.290
Because the prohibition on persons formerly institutionalized for mental health
purposes prohibited possession of firearms even when those persons posed no
danger to themselves or others, the court found § 922(g)(4) was unconstitutional as
applied to the appellant.291
The Third Circuit, in Binderup, applied intermediate scrutiny to hold that the
prohibition of § 922(g)(1)292 was unconstitutional as applied to the appellants who
had been convicted several decades earlier of nonviolent misdemeanors carrying a
penalty exceeding one year in prison.293 The court noted that while the purpose of
the prohibition on convicted criminals owning handguns had both the important and
compelling interest of “preventing armed mayhem,” the government’s attempt to do
so here was not an appropriate method of doing so.294 In discussing the government’s
circuits and the numerous reasons why the Tyler court chose to use strict scrutiny to evaluate
Second Amendment challenges that is worth reading for its own sake. Tyler, 775 F.3d at
317–18.
288
Id. at 329–30 (citing Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms for Self–Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 1443, 1470 (2009)).
289
Id. at 331.
290
Id. (citation omitted).
291
Id. at 343.
292
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2005) (“It shall be unlawful for any person who has been
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
. . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”).
293
Binderup v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 356–57 (3d Cir. 2016).
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Id. at 353.
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attempt at demonstrating a substantial relationship between that interest and the
prohibition on these specific appellants, the court found that there was
no evidence explaining why banning people like them [i.e., people who
decades ago committed similar misdemeanors] from possessing firearms
promotes public safety. The Government claims that someone like Suarez
is “particularly likely to misuse firearms” because he belongs to a category
of “potentially irresponsible persons,” and that someone like Binderup is
“particularly likely to commit additional crimes in the future.” But it must
“present some meaningful evidence, not mere assertions, to justify its
predictive [and here conclusory] judgments.” In these cases neither the
evidence in the record nor common sense supports those assertions.295
In addition to reviewing the relationship of the restrictions of § 922(g) to meet
the government’s desired ends, both the Tyler and Binderup courts found that the
fact that a prohibited person may apply for a relief from his disability did not save
the restrictions from unconstitutionality as applied. Section 925(g) allows prohibited
persons to apply to the Attorney General for relief from the prohibition specifically
applying to him and that relief may be granted if the applicant can demonstrate that
he “will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the
granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.”296 However, both
the Tyler and Binderup courts noted that Congress has failed to appropriate funds to
the DOJ to implement this portion of the statute and has therefore rendered it
inoperative.297 While Tyler acknowledges that the federal government has offered
funds to the states in order to implement the provisions of § 925(c) themselves, the
court noted:
Under this scheme, whether Tyler may exercise his right to bear arms
depends on whether his state of residence has chosen to accept the carrot
of federal grant money and has implemented a relief program. His right
thus would turn on whether his state has taken Congress’s inducement to
cooperate with federal authorities in order to avoid losing anti-crime
funding. An individual’s ability to exercise a “fundamental righ[t]
necessary to our system of ordered liberty” cannot turn on such a
distinction.298
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Id. at 353–54 (alteration in original).
18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (Supp. I 2002), amended by Homeland Security Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-296, 132 Stat. 1636.
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Binderup, 836 F.3d at 355 (citing Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 28 n.1
(2007)); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308, 333 (6th Cir. 2014).
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No court has upheld the prohibition of § 922(g)(4) under intermediate scrutiny.
However, several courts have upheld other restrictions on firearms under this
standard, and their decisions are instructive.
The First, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all upheld the prohibitions
relating to those convicted of domestic abuse under § 922(g)(9) under an
intermediate scrutiny standard.299 Acknowledging that preventing domestic abuse is
an important goal of the government, the courts determined that evidence regarding
recidivism rates of domestic abusers and statistics regarding the use of firearms in
domestic abuse incidents demonstrated that the prohibition was substantially related
to the government’s goals.300
Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Fifth Circuit has found that § 922(b)(1)’s
prohibition on federally licensed firearms dealers selling handguns to people under
the age of twenty-one did not violate the constitutional rights of those under the age
requirement.301 In the same case, the court found that the government had an
important interest in keeping firearms out of the hands of younger adults because
statistics demonstrated that they have a higher propensity for violent crime with
particular types of weapons.302 The court then found that there was a “reasonable
means-ends fit” with the prohibition on adults purchasing specific weapons before
the age of twenty-one while allowing them to acquire other types of weapons or to
be given weapons by guardians, etc.303
Other courts have reviewed prohibitions on the right to keep and bear arms
outside the lens of § 922 and have used the same two-step inquiry in order to
determine the level of scrutiny to apply during constitutional review. For instance,
the Second Circuit adopted intermediate scrutiny to review New York’s restrictive
regulation of publicly carrying firearms.304 The court held that “[r]estricting handgun
possession in public to those who have a reason to possess the weapon for a lawful
purpose” was substantially related to the states’ interests in preventing crime and
ensuring public safety.305 The court noted that “instead of forbidding anyone from
carrying a handgun in public, New York took a more moderate approach to fulfilling
its important objective and reasonably concluded that only individuals having a bona
fide reason to possess handguns should be allowed to introduce them into the public
sphere.”306
299

United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v.
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Similarly, the Third Circuit reviewed a challenge to New Jersey’s handgun
carry laws which required the applicant to have a justifiable need to carry a weapon
in public.307 Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court found that New Jersey had a
justifiable and important goal of protecting citizens of the state from violent
injury.308 The court determined that New Jersey’s method of individually reviewing
each application and considering justifiable need by each individual’s circumstances
was reasonably tailored to serve this need and was therefore constitutional.309
In contrast to the analysis of burdens on the right to bear arms used by the other
circuit courts, the D.C. Circuit recently issued an opinion Wrenn v. District of
Columbia declining to implement the various levels of scrutiny in cases where the
restriction results in what is effectively a total ban on the right to keep and bear
arms.310 In Wrenn, the appellants challenged Washington D.C.’s “good-reason”
law’s restriction of the right to carry in public to those who had a “good reason to
fear injury.”311 After an extended review of the historical nature of the right to bear
arms in public, the D.C. Circuit determined that the core of the Second
Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms extends outside the home to self-defense
in public.312 This is an extension of the right that most other courts have not been
willing to find.313 While the D.C. Circuit recognized that some citizens might be
permitted to bear arms in public for the purpose of self-defense, it noted that the
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The D.C. Circuit court notes that other circuit courts analyzing “good-reason”
restrictions have implemented intermediate scrutiny because they have not done a thorough
historical excavation of the right to bear arms outside of the home and incorrectly view the
right to bear arms publicly as a lesser “twin” of the right to keep arms in the home. Id. at 22–
24. The Seventh Circuit is the only other circuit to assert this stance. In Moore v. Madigan,
Judge Posner wrote that “[t]he Supreme Court has decided that the amendment confers a
right to bear arms for self-defense, which is as important outside the home as inside.” Moore
v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012). The Seventh Circuit then struck down
Illinois’ prohibition on the public carry of firearms without imposing the framework of
scrutiny, stating “[o]ur analysis is not based on degrees of scrutiny, but on Illinois’s failure
to justify the most restrictive gun law of any of the 50 states.” Id. at 941.
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good-reason law is necessarily a total ban on most D.C. residents’ right to
carry a gun in the face of ordinary self-defense needs, where these
residents are no more dangerous with a gun than the next law-abiding
citizen. We say “necessarily” because the law destroys the ordinarily
situated citizen’s right to bear arms not as a side effect of applying other,
reasonable regulations . . . but by design . . . .314
Because the law became effectively a total ban on bearing arms for average, lawabiding citizens, the law was automatically unconstitutional “without bothering to
apply tiers of scrutiny because no such analysis could ever sanction obliterations of
an enumerated constitutional right.”315
B. Analyzing the Prohibition on Financially Incompetent Veterans Reported by the
VA Using the Two-Step Process
Determining which level of scrutiny to give to the inclusion under § 922(g)(4)
of veterans determined financially incompetent for VA purposes is a tricky issue.
Many courts have indicated that they rely upon intermediate scrutiny in cases where
the “core” right granted by the Second Amendment—the right to defend one’s self
in the home with a firearm (or in some circuits the right to bear arms in public)—
was not affected by the challenged law.316 This implies that these specific courts may
prefer strict scrutiny (or an automatic striking down of any restriction when
possession in the home is affected) as is the case with these veterans. However, other
circuit courts are inclined to use intermediate scrutiny regardless of where the
possession and use of the firearm take place, as the prohibition of ownership for
those convicted of domestic abuse crimes demonstrates.317 These courts have viewed
the “core” of the Second Amendment right even more strictly and look to the
language in Heller describing the core of the Second Amendment as “the right of
law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”318
Additionally, the Binderup court noted that procedures allowing for relief from the
314
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317
United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1139–41 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v.
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disability may save an otherwise unconstitutional attack on the core right of the
Second Amendment:
Even if a law that “completely eviscerates the Second Amendment right”
would be per se unconstitutional under Heller, § 922(g)(1) is no such law
. . . . [P]ersons convicted of disqualifying offenses may under some
circumstances possess handguns if (1) their convictions are expunged or
set aside, (2) they receive pardons, or (3) they have their civil rights
restored. And were Congress to fund 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), they could ask
the Attorney General to lift the ban in their particular cases.319
It is entirely possible that despite the fact the VA’s determination of financial
incompetency and subsequent DOJ action of including these persons on the NICS
list seriously limits a veteran’s right to purchase and possess firearms, a challenge
to this prohibition will likely be reviewed under an intermediate scrutiny standard.
This standard may be applied by the courts because the “responsible” nature of the
veterans affected is in question or because the veteran does have an avenue to appeal
the disability leading to the removal of his rights.
Applying the intermediate scrutiny standard to the prohibition on veterans
declared financially incompetent for VA purposes, the government must articulate
an important purpose for prohibiting these veterans from owning firearms.320 The
important purpose, based upon remarks made on the House Floor regarding the
passage of the Veterans 2nd Amendment Protection Act, appears to be a great
concern that these veterans have a higher likelihood of harming themselves and
committing suicide.321 Secondarily, there is also concern that the veterans being
reported as financially incompetent by the VA are a potential threat to the safety of
others.322 The prevention of suicide and the safety of the community are obviously
important and even compelling governmental goals. Undeniably, suicide among
veterans is statistically higher than the civilian population and suicide takes the lives
of approximately twenty veterans every day.323
There is also a belief that those who have been “adjudicated as a mental
defective” must be mentally ill, a category of persons few disagree should be
restricted in firearm ownership.324 While the concerns about suicide among veterans
319

Binderup v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 345 (3d Cir. 2016).
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
321
163 CONG. REC. H2107 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 2017) (statements of Rep. Thompson
and Rep. Bera).
322
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and restriction on gun ownership by the mentally ill are well-made, one must ask if
this process is truly taking weapons out the hands of those who are most likely to
use them to commit suicide or potentially harm others. Therefore, the more
important portion of this analysis will likely turn on whether the reporting of these
financially incompetent veterans to the NICS list is “substantially related” to these
ends or, in a more stringent type of intermediate scrutiny analysis, narrowly tailored
to achieve those ends.325
To be certain, there are veterans who the VA determines to be financially
incompetent for VA purposes because a court has in some way adjudicated the
veteran to be mentally incompetent in another forum.326 These veterans may range
from being declared criminally insane to being declared mentally incompetent to
perform some action and appointed a guardian or conservator by a court.327 The rest
of the veterans deemed financially incompetent are determined by the VA to be
unable to handle their payment of VA benefits.328 As has been demonstrated, these
decisions by the VA are not pinned to a diagnosis of a mental illness. Many of those
declared financially incompetent by the VA may suffer no mental illness at all or are
not incapacitated due to that illness.
For instance, floor debate in the House revealed that more than 1,000 children
entitled to benefits because they were dependents of a deceased veteran have been
reported to the NICS list by the VA “likely because [the] VA appointed a fiduciary
because they are too young to handle their own money.”329 That children, already
not permitted to own firearms, are submitted to the NICS list displays the flaws in
this system—literally anyone who is appointed a fiduciary is reported to the NICS
list and will forever have to admit that they were once a prohibited person for firearm

been committed to a mental institution.’ That these two categories are not coextensive is
made clear by the very fact that the language of § 922(g)(4) expressly refers to two separate
groups.”); Keyes v. Lynch, 195 F. Supp. 3d 702, 719 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (“[I]t appears that this
statute subsection [§ 922(g)(4)] was likely animated by the same concerns that justified the
felon gun dispossession statute subsection in . . . That is, the concern that certain individuals,
whether those with felonies or those with mental illness . . . .”); see, e.g., 163 CONG. REC.
H2104 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 2017) (statement of Rep. Esty) (“[T]his bill could put mentally ill
veterans in harm’s way by giving them easy access to firearms.”); 163 CONG REC. H2113
(daily ed. Mar. 16, 2017) (statement of Rep. Wasserman-Shultz) (“[O]ver one hundredseventy thousand mentally ill veterans would be removed from the National Instant Criminal
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ownership purposes. Additionally, suffering from a mental illness is not an
automatic indicator that a beneficiary may be declared financially incompetent, as
was noted during the floor debate by Representative David Roe:
[T]o show you how the VA’s policy is not consistent: just as an example,
a veteran who is rated at 100 percent disabled for PTSD is not
automatically given a fiduciary, even though the symptoms required for
that rating may include suicidal or homicidal ideation. So they are very
inconsistent about how they do this. And of the 915,744 veterans who have
a service-connected PTSD condition, only 1.7 percent of them have a
fiduciary.330
To be clear, not all veterans rated at 100 percent for PTSD have received that rating
due to suicidal or homicidal ideations.331 These are just some indicators that a
veteran may be entitled to a 100 percent rating.332 The more important point is that
at no time during this “adjudication” process is any consideration given to whether
a person may be a danger to himself or to others.333 Veterans who may qualify as
such a danger are not declared financially incompetent by the VA unless some
comment is made by a C&P examiner or some scrap of evidence is found in the file
that the veteran cannot manage his own funds.334 Meanwhile, those veterans who
pose no harm to anyone and may or may not suffer from a mental illness are reported
in the same manner as those society has determined to be “too irresponsible or too
dangerous to be trusted with firearms,” such as felons and drug addicts.335 As the
D.C. Circuit noted in Wrenn, “the point of the [Second] Amendment [is] . . . that
guns would be available to each responsible citizen as a rule (i.e., at least to those
no more prone to misuse that access than anyone else).”336 The disconnect between
this principle and the VA’s procedures is bewildering.
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Legislators who opposed stopping the VA’s reporting of financially
incompetent veterans to the DOJ nonetheless recognized that many who get caught
up in the VA’s reporting system are not people the NICS list intends to capture. For
instance, Representative Elizabeth Esty notes that “I agree that the current process
is overinclusive, and I agree that we must do more to ensure veterans have sufficient
notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a meaningful opportunity to appeal any
decision that may impact their constitutional rights.”337 While government action
reviewed under intermediate scrutiny is not required to be the least restrictive means
of accomplishing the goal,338 the government means must not burden a right more
than is reasonably necessary in order to do so.339
In light of this haphazard determination of who is reported and the overinclusion of non-dangerous veterans, a court would be hard-pressed to find that the
VA’s practice of reporting veterans found financially incompetent to the NICS list
and thus prohibiting them from possessing or purchasing firearms is substantially
related to keeping firearms out of the hands of dangerous persons—particularly
when no adjudication is made as to the veteran’s dangerousness. Additionally, while
the BATFE has defined “a mental defective” as someone who cannot contract or
manage his own affairs, the VA’s declaration of financial incompetence does not
determine a veteran’s ability to contract.340 Nor does the VA adjudicate a veteran’s
ability to manage his affairs in total.341 The VA’s decision applies only to a veteran
receiving financial benefits from the VA and not to any other monies or interests
that the veteran may very well be managing himself.
Congress has already decided that these financial incompetency adjudications
by the SSA would not be successful enough in identifying dangerous individuals.342
Congress’s joint resolution forbidding the SSA from reporting its financially
incompetent beneficiaries to the NICS list indicates that the risk of depriving many
law-abiding, responsible citizens, of their constitutional rights outweighs the
possibility of labeling some at-risk individuals as prohibited persons.343
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Considering that the VA’s isolated adjudication of financial incompetency has
a high likelihood of being made erroneously (based upon the remand rates of appeals
from VA decisions), along with the complicated evidentiary standard of proof
required of a VA employee with no specialized training in either mental health,
medicine, or law, the injustice becomes clearer. The decision to report these veterans
as “mental defectives” is not “reasonably” or “substantially related” to keeping
weapons out of the hands of those likely to harm themselves or others. Viewing these
concerns in light of the long wait times for judges to actually review decisions of
financial incompetency, it is apparent that a veteran does not have a reasonable
method of appealing these incompetency decisions.
Based upon these facts, an as-applied challenge to the application of
§ 922(g)(4) to a veteran declared financially incompetent by the VA is likely to
succeed under intermediate scrutiny. If the challenge passes intermediate scrutiny,
it would also pass the stringent strict scrutiny standard.
VI. PROTECTING VETERANS FROM SECOND AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS
Two major concerns exist within the process of stripping veterans determined
“financially incompetent for VA purposes” of their Second Amendment rights. The
first concern deals with the process used to make determinations of financial
incompetency. Making this process fairer, more efficient, and speedier could be the
subject of another article and has already been written on as noted earlier.344 The
second concern focuses on the decision to use faulty adjudications to then label the
veterans “adjudicated as a mental defective.” It is this second concern that these
suggestions address.
The first step is to stop using the VA’s adjudications of financial incompetency
to affect veteran’s Second Amendment rights. The House’s Veterans 2nd
Amendment Protection Act is a first step in protecting the rights of future veterans
declared financially incompetent by the VA.345 The Senate should pass this bill and
the President should sign it to stop the unconstitutional infringement on these rights.
This would prevent additional veterans from being affected. However, this bill
provides no remedy for the 150,000 veterans already on the NICS list due to a
344
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financial incompetency determination. A plan must be introduced to reinstate the
constitutional rights of the Second Amendment to these veterans.
One solution is to remove all names from the NICS list reported by a VA
adjudication of financial incompetence that was not predicated on a civil or criminal
court action finding the veteran incompetent. Acknowledging that this approach will
encounter political backlash, a more measured approach may require the VA to
comb through all cases of veterans referred to the NICS list and determine the reason
for the decision of incompetency. Those veterans whose incompetency for VA
purposes was based upon a state court decision that a veteran was mentally
incompetent could be separated out from veterans whose incompetency
determination was based solely on a VA finding of financial incompetence for VA
purposes. Veterans found incompetent for VA purposes without an underlying
judicial finding of mental incompetence could be immediately culled from the NICS
list.
Another option could involve revamping the appeals process for veterans to
demonstrate that they are not a “mental defective”—because they are not a danger
to themselves or others—with an expectation that such appeals would be granted
liberally. The current VA process to appeal for relief from the prohibitions of
§ 922(g)(4) is extremely onerous on a veteran. A more streamlined process where a
veteran may certify that he has never been adjudicated dangerous to himself or
others, combined with a background check that he has never been convicted of a
violent crime, may be the least restrictive option to reinstate these veterans’ rights.
This method would still appeal to those who are concerned that a wholesale removal
of financially incompetent veterans from the list will put guns in the hands of the
dangerously mentally ill.
A more restrictive option could require the veteran to go through a hearing of
some type in a federal district court where the judge and prosecutor could investigate
the specific background of the veteran to determine that he is not a danger to himself
or others. This, of course, would be extremely burdensome to both the veteran and
the government and would lead to numerous costs, including the cost of an attorney
for the veteran, unless the court appoints attorneys to the veterans at no cost. This
final plan is not ideal because it may allow a court and prosecutor to come at these
veteran’s cases from a presumption that the veteran is a “mental defective” and place
a burden on the veteran to demonstrate why he is not.
Instead, due to the unconstitutional removal of the veteran’s Second
Amendment rights, the burden should be placed on the government to demonstrate
why the veteran is a danger to himself or others or lacks the mental capacity to
contract or manage his own affairs. If the government cannot demonstrate this, then
the veteran should be removed from the NICS list.
Convoluted options involving the restoration of constitutional rights to those
improperly stripped of them is not an ideal solution to this problem and should be
avoided in favor of a more streamlined process.
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CONCLUSION
The effect on those veterans currently being deprived of their Second
Amendment rights due to a VA declaration of financial incompetence is significant.
The process by which this deprivation occurs is uneven, imprecise, and often flawed
both in substance and procedure. Veterans are the only classification of people who
are categorically denied the right to possess a firearm because they are found
incapable of handling a financial payment from a federal agency, without a more
generalized finding or judicial determination that they are unable to manage their
own affairs or that they are a danger to themselves or others. This situation is
untenable and even Congress recognizes that something must be done.
To be clear, there are veterans currently flagged in the background
check system who should not be there, and we need to create a fair and
streamlined process for veterans to appeal their status.
But there is a balance between protecting veterans’ Second
Amendment rights and protecting veterans who are a danger to themselves
or others.346
This statement returns us to the question asked at the beginning of this Article:
“[W]hile the current process the VA uses to declare a veteran a ‘mental defective’
may inadvertently identify some veterans who are a danger to themselves or others
and thus prevent them from obtaining firearms, is the overreaching impact on the
constitutional rights of veterans who have never been adjudicated a threat an
acceptable trade-off?” Based upon the court’s understanding of the right to keep and
bear arms, the clear realization of both proponents and opponents of the Veterans
2nd Amendment Protection Act that the VA’s current process violates the
constitutional rights of many veterans, and the plain realization that the
determinations of financial incompetency by the VA are often haphazardly made,
the answer is clear. Depriving veterans of their constitutional rights based upon the
VA’s process of determining financial incompetence for VA purposes is not
acceptable. This realization played a role in Congress’s joint resolution to prevent
the SSA from doing the same thing.
Despite this recognition, Congress continually stalls in the process of cleaning
it up, leaving one to wonder why it is acceptable to stamp out the constitutional
rights of our military veterans in a way we do not endorse for our other citizens
under the Social Security system. Why are the rights of military veterans viewed as
less important, less treasured, and less secured than the rights of other Americans?
Litigation on this issue and federal court orders may be the only way to instill a sense
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of urgency in Congress to reinstate to our veterans the rights they have fought for
and secured for the rest of our nation. Regardless of the method used to restore the
rights unconstitutionally stripped from veterans, something must be done now
because to continue to dishonor our veterans in this manner truly is a national
embarrassment.

